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Despite the political impetus for greater multilateralism in international military 
operations, recent coalitions including U.S. forces reflect a trend toward increasing U.S. 
dominance and decreasing allied participation.  As the United States continues to invest 
in its military with research, development and acquisition budgets at least double that of 
any other nation, it fields technologies so advanced with respect to its allies as to leave 
them incompatible for combined operations.  Recent coalition operations suggest that 
there is a close relationship between technological asymmetries created by partner 
contributions and the structures formed as the coalition assembles.  Using Desert Storm 
and Operation Allied Force as case studies, this thesis identifies a systemic relationship 
between technological advantage and coalition dominance.  As a coalition seeks to 
reduce aggregate risk, it relies on technologies that offer the greatest effectiveness.  This 
reliance causes the coalition to divert combat burden to the technologically dominant 
partner which, in turn, imposes its operational culture.  This thesis concludes that the 
technological transformation currently underway in the U.S. Department of Defense 
conflicts with U.S. political initiatives to promote greater multilateralism in combat 
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Two themes run through American strategic thought today that offer different 
perspectives for the future of U.S. military capability.  One school of thought considers 
technology to be the key to American military dominance.1  Another believes closer 
working relationships with allies and multilateral coalitions to be the best way to generate 
enduring American influence.2  Advocates of these two approaches suggest that they are 
not mutually exclusive strategies to guarantee future U.S. military primacy.  Upon closer 
examination, however, these two potential strategies tend to be exclusive and non-
complimentary.   
The coalition school advocates claim that multi-lateral operations provide 
international credibility, increase deterrence, and create synergy through combined 
participation.  A multilateral approach is believed to contribute to an international regime 
of cooperation that promotes peaceful solutions and dissuades deviance from 
international norms.3  The technology school advocates significant investments in 
                                                 
1 Two strains of this debate exist today.  One doctrinal discussion debates the existence of a revolution 
in military affairs related to the technological developments in information technologies and precision 
weapons: for a representative sample of the literature see Michael O'Hanlon, 2000, Technological Change 
and the Future of Warfare, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press; Bill Owens and Ed Offley, 2000, 
Lifting the Fog of War, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; Michèle A. Flournoy, Julianne Smith, Guy 
Ben-Ari, Kathleen McInnis, David Scruggs, 2005, European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap 
between Strategy and Capabilities, Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies; Barry 
R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter, eds., 1995, Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, 
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press; and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Roger K. Smith, eds., 1992, 
After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War, New York: Madison Books.  The other strain may found in the 
DoD’s force transformation initiatives: see Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, 
February 6, 2006; Joint Vision 2020, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000, 
http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm (Accessed 15 Aug 2006); and The U.S. Air Force 
Transformation Flight Plan, Washington, DC: HQ USAF, Future Concepts and Transformation Division, 
November 2003, http://www.af.mil/library/posture/AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN-2003.pdf (Accessed 15 
Aug 1006). 
2 For a sample of the discussion of the benefits of multilateral operations, see Robert H. Scales, Jr., 
2000, Future War Anthology: Revised Edition, Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College and 
Robert W. Ricassi, 1993, "Principles for Coalition Warfare," Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer 1993): 58-
71.  For discussion of coalition operations as it relates to doctrinal and training issues see Myron Hura, 
Gary McLeod, Eric Larson, James Schneider, Daniel Gonzales, Dan Norton, Jody Jacobs, Kevin 
O’Connell, William Little, Richard Mesic, Lewis Jamison, 2000, Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge 
in Coalition Air Operations, Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 
3 For coverage of the neo-liberal institutionalism, see Robert Keohane, “After Hegemony:Cooperation 
and Discord in the World Political Economy,” in Robert Keohane, 1984,  After Hegemony: Cooperation 
and Discord in the World Political Economy,  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; and Stephen 
Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in Stephen 
Krasner, ed., 1983, International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
2 
technologies that act as force multipliers.  Technologists suggest that the world is 
undergoing a revolution in military affairs (RMA), and that certain technologies multiply 
the force potential of a military by improving efficiency and speed while reducing 
logistical requirements.4   
Unfortunately, the literature debating these schools does not venture outside their 
respective paradigms to consider their impact on other areas of strategy, military 
operations and overall foreign and defense policy.  The coalition school remains focused 
on diplomatic and policy relationships while the technology school remains focused on 
operational considerations.  In reality, there is a close relationship between technology 
and the formation of coalitions and their military operations.  Technological capabilities 
effect the contributions to and cooperation within military coalitions. 
 
A. TECHNOLOGY AND COALITIONS 
Current trends in defense spending, force structures, and military organization 
suggest that the United States will remain technologically far ahead of its allies for the 
foreseeable future.  Some estimates predict that even if European allies increase spending 
to levels recommended by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), decades will 
be required for them to catch up to U.S. capabilities.5  Outside of NATO, only a handful 
of countries possess the potential to “buy up” to U.S. military capability within the next 
decade or two, and not all of those are U.S. allies.6 
The overwhelming U.S. advantage in defense expenditures translates to more-
modern equipment and more of it.  With U.S. acquisition budgets twice the size of its 
                                                 
4 Literature covering the pros and cons of the technological force multipliers, technological force 
transformation, and the RMA is deep; for a representative sample see: O'Hanlon; Nye; Owens; Carl H. 
Builder, 1994, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Airpower Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. 
Air Force, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers; Richard H. Schultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. 
(eds.), 1992,  The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War,  Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air 
University Press; and John E. Peters, Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, Traci Williams, 
2001,  European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation, 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND.  
5 William Drozdiak, 1999, “War Showed U.S.-Allied Inequality,” Washington Post (June 28): A1. 
6 United States leads total world defense spending.  China is second at 1/6th U.S. spending and France 
and Japan follow with less than 1/10th of U.S. defense spending (2005 estimates).  The World Factbook, 
United States Central Intelligence Agency Website, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/ 2067rank.html (Accessed 17 May 2006). 
3 
European allies, and triple in research and development, U.S. forces can expect to fight 
along side materially and technologically inferior coalition partners.7  What does this 
mean for the future of coalition war fighting?  How should the United States expect less 
capable forces to integrate into its war-fighting machine?  How should allies expect U.S. 
forces to assist their military forces? 
This thesis investigates the question: How do technological disparities affect 
coalition structures?  Coalition partners tend to favor technologies that increase the 
likelihood of success and lower the costs of participation.  Following these technologies 
through resulting coalition structures, systemic trends in coalition burden sharing, 
technological reliance, and operational culture emerge.   
Focusing on operations Desert Storm and Allied Force (OAF), this thesis 
identifies systemic trends in coalition structures attributable to technology asymmetries 
among the coalition partners.  The analysis that follows indicates that technological 
disparities among forces participating in a coalition lead to unilateral structures within the 
operation.  While it may experience wide participation among contributors, the coalition 
will exhibit the operational culture of the technologically advantaged partner including 
leadership responsibilities, combat burden, and command and control.   
 
B. UNILATERAL COALITIONS 
In both Desert Storm and OAF, the United States provided new technology in 
great quantities.  This may lead one to consider U.S. dominance in both cases over-
determined:  the United States provided the most forces, enjoyed the status as the sole 
remaining superpower, and wielded a GDP and related defense budget that could absorb 
the costs of a major conflict. 8 Some studies suggest that this is typically the case: the 
most capable or dominant member is destined to provide a disproportionate contribution 
                                                 
7 David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler and Martin D. Libicki, 1999, Mind the Gap: Promoting a 
Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs, Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 39. 
8 Some contributing causal factors include: overwhelming military strength in both numbers and 
technology; four decades of NATO leadership defaulted leadership to the United States in any NATO 
dominated operation; status as a world leader demanded a leadership role in order to preserve its 
superpower status.  See Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger, 1994, “Burden-Sharing in the 
Persian Gulf War,” International Organization, 48 (1) (Winter): 39-75; Peters, et al. European 
contributions, 53-55 and Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, 1996, The Lessons of Modern 
War, Volume IV: The Gulf War, Boulder, CO: WestviewPress, 72-74. 
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to a coalition.9  Others disagree, arguing that Desert Storm did not follow this model.  
They suggest that conditions leading to the formation of the coalition and the nature of 
the operation produced an equitable distribution of contributions, despite the wide array 
of participants and large degree of technological disparity.10   
Assessments that state the general equity of burden sharing in recent coalitions 
tend to consider contributions from a strictly economic perspective where basing and 
financial contributions are equal to personnel and equipment commitments.  Despite the 
financial equity among contributors in Desert Storm, however, the operation 
demonstrated distinctly American characteristics.  Videos of U.S. laser-guided bombs 
flying through windows filled news broadcasts and half a million U.S. troops represented 
the main thrust of the ground effort.  In OAF, U.S. generals occupied key leadership 
positions while U.S. planes provided the bulk of the combat power.  In both cases, more 
U.S. troops and equipment were subject to enemy fire than the rest of their coalitions 
combined.11 
Some argue that the mere size of the U.S. military necessarily places the United 
States in a leadership position.  John Peters argues that European forces combined rival 
the U.S. military in size but remain irrelevant without the ability to project their military 
beyond their border.  European militaries continue to maintain large, non-deployable 
forces tailored to border defense and lack the lift capabilities to project power outside of 
their region.12  The cost of maintaining this cold-war-oriented force combined with large 
social welfare commitments prevents European militaries from ever reaching military 
parity with the United States in terms of force projection.13   
                                                 
9 Andrew Bennet, Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger reference three hypotheses that submit that either 
the dominant or most capable state in alliance contributes disproportionately to an alliance.  They allude to 
Mancur Olson’s expectation hypothesis, Robert Keohane’s hegemonic state hypothesis, and Stephen Walt’s 
balance-of-threat hypothesis: see footnotes 4, 5, 7, and 10 in Bennett, et al., “Burden Sharing in the Persian 
Gulf War,” 41-43. 
10 Ibid., 39-75. 
11 Chapter II provides a plethora of statistics demonstrating that the U.S. provided over half of the 
forces in both conflicts. 
12 Jeffery P. Bialos and Stuart L. Koehl, 2005, The NATO Response Force: Facilitating Coalition 
Warfare through Technology Transfer and Information Sharing, Washington D.C.: Center for Technology 
and National Security Policy, National Defense University. 
13 Gompert, et al., Mind the Gap and Richard Sokolsky, Stuart Johnson, F. Stephen Larrabee (eds.), 
2000, Improving Allied Military Contributions, Santa Monica, CA: RAND.  
5 
European allies continue to demonstrate either their inability or unwillingness to 
fund technology upgrades for their militaries.  Studies of the growing capabilities gap 
between the United States and its allies suggest that allied failure to fund research and 
development and acquire new equipment will leave the allies forever in the United 
States’ shadow. 14  These studies point to many of the symptoms and causes of the 
growing technology disparity between the United States and its allies, but none of the 
studies spend time on the systemic ramifications.  Recommendations in this literature 
tend to remain tactical and technical and feature one common theme: allies must spend 
more money to “catch up” to U.S. technology.  The literature overlooks more systemic 
trends caused by technological asymmetry; therefore, it does not consider a more realistic 
future where the United States continues to overwhelm its allies with its technological 
superiority. 
The OAF case demonstrates that despite its leadership role, the United States did 
not enjoy the freedom of being the leader among coalition partners.  U.S. generals 
serving in OAF filled command positions.15  Nevertheless, even from the position of 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Wesley Clark complained that coalition 
political influences constrained the military’s ability to execute their plan for the 
campaign.16  The key to these complaints was that it was U.S. commanders complaining 
they could not execute their plan.  The U.S. military so dominated the coalition that its 
way of war became the coalition’s way of war.  This thesis argues that the coalition 
allowed the United States to imprint its warfighting paradigm on the operations in 
deference to the technologies the Americans contributed.    
                                                 
14 A partial list of these studies includes:  Bennett, et al., “Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War;” 
Benjamin S. Lambeth, 2001, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: Strategic and Operational Assessment, Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND; DoD’s  Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report: Report to Congress, 
Washington D.C.: United States Department of Defense, 2000; Peters, et. al., European Contributions to 
Operation Allied Force; and Anthony H. Cordesman, 2001, The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and 
Missile Campaign in Kosovo, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001. 
15 General Wesley Clark as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Admiral James Ellis as 
Commander in Chief Southern Forces (CINCSOUTH), and Lieutenant General Michael Short as Combined 
and Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC).   
16 For commentary by senior U.S. leaders during and following OAF see: John A. Tirpuk, 1999, “The 
NATO Way of War,” Air Force Magazine, 82 (12) (December), http://www.afa.org/magazine/ 
dec1999/1299watch_print.html (Accessed 10 May 06); Richard Parker, 1999, “NATO strategy doubted, 
Air chief queries chance of success,” The Denver Post (May 23), 2nd ed., A-1; and Eric Q. Winograd, 




This paper uses two cases, Operation Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force, to 
examine the effects of technological asymmetry on coalition structures.  The first case, 
Desert Storm, presents a coalition consisting of a wide array of members, many of which 
had not worked together previously.  Despite its unique nature, Desert Storm provides an 
example of a tightly formed coalition with clear objectives and strategic agreement.  This 
case offers an example of technology asymmetries, related obstacles, and solutions in an 
environment of relative harmony among coalition members.   
From a technology perspective, Desert Storm provides examples of both relative 
parity and significant disparity in specific mission areas.  For example, low-technology 
weapons were common among coalition partners—the allies used relatively small 
quantities of high-technology weapons.17  Therefore, weapons capability provides an 
example of relative parity.  Significant disparity existed, however, between U.S. weapons 
platforms and those employed by the rest of the coalition. 
OAF provides an example of a mature coalition consisting of members of a long-
standing alliance, NATO, in which the partners spent decades organizing, planning and 
training together.  In this case, coalition members disagreed on policy and strategic goals 
causing significant challenges for organizational structures, war planners, and targeteers.  
In this less harmonious atmosphere, the partners reached consensus less easily.  
Cooperation challenges emerging from coalition disagreements provide cases of 
obstacles mitigated or exacerbated by technology. 
The coalition in OAF used many more high-technology weapons and systems 
than the coalition in Desert Storm.  The sensitive nature of the engagement both 
internationally and domestically created a system of restrictions that relied on these high 
technology systems for mission execution.  For example, systems such as targeting pods, 
ground mapping radars and night vision goggles allowed U.S. forces to locate and 
identify enemy forces in adverse conditions while allied forces without them could not.  
                                                 
17 Only eight percent of the weapons used in Desert Storm were considered precision-guided.  
MILITARY OPERATIONS: Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved Communications and Technology, 
but Barriers to Continued Progress Remain, Washington D.C.: United States General Accounting Office 
(June 2004), GAO-04-547, 9. 
7 
Additionally, the exclusive use of airpower in this conflict allows a narrow focus on 
particular technological asymmetries that had grown within the NATO alliance.  
The use of only two cases and the difficulty establishing consistent metrics to 
quantify technology asymmetry and the resulting coalition structures requires the use of a 
process trace to discern systemic trends.18  As Steven Metz argues, technological 
asymmetries exist in many forms and in various uses.19  Correspondingly, the coalition 
structures formed or altered by interoperability deficiencies exist in many forms and uses.  
By tracing the asymmetry from the external, antecedent conditions through the resulting 
structural elements, this analysis filters many of the over-determining factors attributed to 
the United States’ dominant role.   
This analysis begins by identifying the conditions present during the formation of 
the coalition.  These conditions include political and strategic factors that established the 
coalitions’ objectives, tolerance for risk, and forces contributed.  The availability of 
technologies to abate risk and enhance success led to dependence within the coalition.  In 
the cases considered in this analysis, U.S.-exclusive technologies offered many 
advantages that allied capabilities could not match.  These technology disparities led to a 
reliance on U.S.-exclusive technologies. 
The process continues from reliance to burden sharing.  Reliance on U.S.-
technologies led to operational burdens accumulating with U.S. forces.  In both Desert 
Storm and OAF, the United States subjected the greater percentage of forces to combat, 
assumed leadership responsibilities and executed war planning tasks.  The technological 
advantage enjoyed by the Unites States resulted in acceptance of the majority of the 
burden. 
As coalition leadership filled with U.S. commanders and the bulk of the combat 
burden fell to U.S. forces, the coalition took on a U.S. personality.  Command structures,  
 
                                                 
18 Stephen Van Evra’s process trace methodology allows for comparative analysis in a small-n study.  
For a description of the process trace, see Stephen Van Evra, 1997, Guide to Methods for Students of 
Political Science, Ithaca, N.Y,: Cornell University Press, 64-67. 
19 Steven Metz, “The Effect of Technological Asymmetry on Coalition Operations,” in Thomas J. 
Marshall, Phillip Kaiser and Jon Kessmeire (eds.), 1996,  Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition 
Operations, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 51. 
8 
war plans, and combat execution aligned with American doctrine.  The more the United 
States dominated the coalition with its technological advantages the more the coalition 
looked like a U.S. operation. 
Through this process, time emerged as an intervening variable affecting the 
degree of influence technological asymmetry had on the coalition structure.  In Desert 
Storm, nearly six months of lead-time prior to the start of combat operations allowed the 
coalition to mitigate technological disparities thereby increasing the breadth of 
participation.  In OAF, a relatively small amount of time between the decision to commit 
forces and the start of combat operations forced the coalition to create interoperability 
work-arounds that isolated, if not excluded, allies from operations within the coalition. 
 
1. Limitations 
Assessing the effects of technological asymmetry on the United States’ leadership 
role is a difficult exercise.  Drawing a relationship between asymmetry and U.S. 
leadership independent of force quantities must actually assume equal contributions 
among the coalition partners.  Separating technological advantage and simple force size 
advantage presents a challenge in determining the causal influence on coalition 
structures.  Both relate proportionally to defense spending and related acquisition, 
research and development budgets.  This creates a temptation to dismiss offhandedly the 
United States’ leadership role in both campaigns as attributable to the size of the military 
it is able to buy with its superpower economy.   
A review of defense spending trends relating to technological capabilities does 
not suggest a direct relationship between defense spending and technological capability.  
First, spending on acquisition and research and development (R&D) as a percentage of 
total defense spending varies widely among U.S. allies.20  Second, despite significant 
differences in absolute defense spending, countries such as France, Germany, Great 
Britain, and the Netherlands contributed some capabilities that narrowed technological 
                                                 
20 Only Turkey and Great Britain have comparable percentages at around 30%.  Others are 
approximately 20% or less.  For a list of allies considered, their absolute defense spending and as a 
percentage of GDP, and the percentage of defense spent on acquisition and R&D. 2004 Statistical 
Compendium on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2004/allied2004.pdf (Accessed 22 March 2006), D-9. 
9 
disparities in certain areas.21  In fact, Anthony Cordesman argues that Great Britain was 
one of the few allied partners who possessed a high degree of interoperability with the 
United States despite an acquisition and R&D budget roughly 1/10th the size of the 
United States.22  Certainly, in each of these cases, contributing coalition partners could 
not combine the advanced technology with large force quantities, as could the United 
States.  In certain capability areas, however, the partners did possess some level of 
comparable technological capability despite their R&D spending.   
Additionally, sheer numbers of troops do not necessarily determine coalition 
leadership.  Commanding U.S. generals in OAF complained that political influence from 
coalition partners restrained strategic and operational planning and execution.23  In 
Desert Storm, Saudi Arabia insisted on a parallel command structure giving their 
commanding general an equivalent status to the U.S. commanding general, Gen. Norman 
Schwarzkopf.  While HRH General Khaled bin Sultan, Joint Forces Commander, 
confesses that ultimate command decision rested with the United States, Saudi Arabia 
continued to exercise its equal status as host nation and commander of Arab forces.24  In 
both cases, members of the coalition denied absolute leadership to the United States 
through continuous political pressure.   
 
2. Definitions 
Coalition warfare requires some degree of integration among members of the 
combined force.  The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) uses the term “interoperability” 
to refer to this integration.  In Joint Publication 1-02, DoD defines interoperability as, 
                                                 
21 France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands contributed precision-guided strike capabilities in OAF.  
Great Britain contributed electronic warfare capability to both Desert Storm and OAF. Germany 
contributed electronic warfare capability to OAF.  See Cordesman and Wagner, 156-210, for a brief 
summary of coalition force contributions to Desert Storm.  For a brief summary of allied aircraft 
contributions to OAF see Sokolsky, et al., Table 4.2, 74 and Cordesman and Wagner, 36-40 and 47-48. 
22 Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo, 165. 
23 Lt. Gen. Short was a vocal critic of the political pressure applied by coalition partners on military 
operations, Drozdiak, “War Showed U.S.-Allied Inequality,” A-1 and Cordesman and Wagner, 66-72. 
24 Khaled bin Sultan, 1995, Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces 
Commander, London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 197. 
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The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept 
services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so 
exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.25  
Myron Hura expands on this definition by suggesting that the degree of similarity in 
capabilities “[reflect] their fungibility in supporting coalition military goals.”26  He refers 
to interoperability as an “enabler” facilitating closer cooperation and broader coalition 
participation.27 
Measuring technical asymmetry within a coalition is problematic.  The term 
“technological asymmetry” suggests an advantage/disadvantage relationship among 
coalition partners along a linear scale of technological progress.  But technological 
asymmetry is not a matter of levels of technological capabilities, rather, it is a qualitative 
relationship existing in one of three forms: the degree of reliance the participant places on 
the technology; the form of the technology (e.g., formats and standards); and the uses for 
which the participant employs the technology.28  This analysis will use “technology 
asymmetry” and “technology disparity” interchangeably referring to differing types, 
forms, and uses of technology and implying an interoperability deficiency. 
When addressing a technological asymmetry, coalition partners may take one of 
three courses of action.  They may ignore or isolate the asymmetry without correcting the 
interoperability deficiency.  An example of this would the exclusion of a capability from 
an operation because of an inability to integrate technologies or operating capabilities 
with coalition partners.  The coalition may “fix” the disparity by resolving it at its roots.  
This may involve a technology, policy or strategy such as transferring technology to 
allies.  Lastly, a coalition may merely mitigate the effects of the disparity by developing a 
“work-around.”  Work-arounds involve short-term solutions such as software patches or 
geographical separation of forces.29   
                                                  
25 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 
April 2001 (As Amended Through 31 August 2005). Washington D.C.: Department of Defense. 
26 Hura, et al., 8. 
27 Ibid., 8. 
28 Metz, 53. 
29 Michele Zanini and Jennifer Morrison Taw, 1999, The Army and Multinational Force 
Compatibility, Arlington, VA: Arroyo Center, RAND, 30. 
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D. CASE STUDIES 
In Operation Desert Storm, political conditions leading to the formation of the 
coalition pre-determined a leadership role for the United States.  From the outset, the 
United States committed itself to Saudi Arabia’s defense.30  This unilateral commitment, 
in both rhetoric and substance, established a foundation on which a coalition could form.  
While motivations and types of contributions varied by country, the totality of the 
contributions and the series of almost unanimous United Nations (UN) resolutions 
indicated the international community’s disapproval of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.31  This 
political agreement led, in turn, to clear, coherent strategic objectives agreed to by the 
coalition as a whole: destroy Iraq's military capability to wage war, gain and maintain air 
supremacy, cut Iraqi supply lines, destroy Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) 
capability, destroy Republican Guard forces, and liberate Kuwait City with Arab forces.32 
While financial contributions deferred up to 90% of U.S. war costs, the United 
States contributed the majority of the military capability to the effort.33   The United 
States provided twice as many troops, planes, ships, and tanks as the rest of the allies 
combined, and yet, did not own sole command of the coalition.34  Saudi Arabian 
sensitivities and the political expediency of organizing other regional partners under 
Saudi Arabian command led to a parallel command structure with U.S. Central Command 
                                                 
30 Prior to any international commitments, the United States committed over 200,000 troops to Saudi 
Arabia’s defense for Operation Desert Shield.  Following the decision to eject Iraq from Kuwait, the United 
State doubled this commitment, again prior to additional commitments from other nations.  Conduct of the 
Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Washington D.C.: United States Department of Defense, 
April 1992, 58-64. 
31 Bennet, et al., argue that in the aggregate, the contributions of the coalition members are not 
explained by Walt’s bandwagoning or balancing behavior as outlined in his alliance formation theory.  See 
Stephen M. Walt, 1985, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9 
(4) (Spring): 3-43; and Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger, 1997, Friends in Need: 
Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War,  New York: St. Martin’s Press.  For a list of the applicable UN 
resolutions, see Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, 368. 
32 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 580. 
33 The United States received $53 billion dollars, cash or in-kind payment, in reimbursements against 
the estimated $61 billion it spent on the war.  Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 225. 
34 Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume V, Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force 
(1993), 42-47 and 50; and Cordesman and Wagner, 94. 
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(CENTCOM) commanding one part of the force and Saudi Arabia’s Joint Force 
Command leading the other.35 
Politically, the United States assumed a leadership role from the outset.  
Militarily, the massive capabilities of its forces in theater left no doubt as to the United 
States’ role as coalition leader.  To understand the influence of technology on the 
coalition, these aspects of the campaign must be set aside.  This study examines this case 
from a perspective tightly focused on technology.  Most important for this analysis is an 
assessment of the political coherence of the coalition and the strategic agreement among 
its members. 
The technologies that grabbed the spotlight in Desert Storm continue to fuel the 
ongoing debate about a late 20th century RMA.  In the force application areas, these 
technologies include airborne radar surveillance systems, Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS) and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS); stealth 
aircraft and Tomahawk cruise missiles; night vision and thermal imaging devices; the 
M1A1 tank; and precision-guided munitions.  While not all of these were new to the 
battlefield, their use in quantity and in coordinated operations established a new 
precedent in war fighting technology. 
Another aspect of the Desert Storm coalition makes it an appropriate case for this 
analysis.  The coalition had over five months to deploy, organize, train, and prepare for 
offensive operations.  Over this time, the coalition worked to resolve a large number of 
technological asymmetry issues.  Using the process trace, this analysis considers time an 
intervening variable that provided a mitigation function for asymmetries by allowing the 
opportunity to identify problems and implement fixes or work-arounds. 
Using an alliance as the basis for a coalition introduces an obligation for 
participating countries that reduces their subordinate posture.  In OAF, rhetoric 
supporting intervention in Serbia as a NATO mission phrased human rights issues in 
terms of threats to stability in Europe.  OAF represented the first overt, multi-national 
violation of international law in the interest of human rights.  It relied heavily on multi-
                                                 
35 For a breakdown of forces under each command see Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 574-578 and 
for a diagram of the high-level command relationships See Cordesman and Wagner, 230. 
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national participation to preserve the credibility and integrity of a campaign that clearly 
violated the borders of a sovereign nation.36 
Unlike Desert Storm, arguments for intervention were less convincing, leaving 
allied countries with more tenuous domestic support for military action.  Without massive 
support for action, member nations argued more complicated positions manifested in the 
ambiguous political objectives set for intervention: ensure stability in Eastern Europe, 
thwart ethnic cleansing, and ensure NATO credibility.37 
Politically ambiguous goals led to ambiguous strategic objectives, which in turn, 
led to operational and tactical restraints.  Like its political objectives, the coalition’s 
strategic objectives reflected its lack of resolution:   
- Demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to Belgrade’s 
aggression in the Balkans. 
- Deter Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless 
civilians and create conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing. 
- Damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future or 
spread the war to neighbors by diminishing or degrading its ability to 
conduct military operations.38 
Ambiguous political and strategic objectives created space for participants to leverage 
domestic political concerns into a low-risk operational philosophy.39  Since NATO 
credibility was a political objective, maintaining coalition unity became a strategic 
imperative.  As General Clark explained following the war, the coalition placed higher 
priority on maintaining the alliance than in striking any individual target..40 
This low-risk dynamic put direct pressure on coalition operations that only U.S. 
technology could alleviate.  In the area of force application, three politically motivated, 
                                                 
36 Michael Glennon, 1999, “The New Interventionism: The Search for Just International Law,” 
Foreign Affairs 78 (3) (May/June): 2-7 
37 William S. Cohen and Henry H. Shelton, “Message from Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen 
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry H. Shelton,” preface to Kosovo/Operation Allied Force 
After-Action Report: Report to Congress, 1. 
38 Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 7. 
39 Paul E. Gallis (coordinator), 1999, Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force, 
Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Report #RL30374, 2-5. 
40 Winograd, 2.  
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low-risk constraints set up technology reliance within the coalition.  First, member 
nations’ low tolerance for risk was manifest in two obvious constraints: the unwillingness 
to commit ground troops to the campaign and the requirement for aircraft to stay above 
15,000 feet during combat operations.  Second, tenuous world support meant a low 
tolerance for collateral damage.  Third, weather and terrain exacerbated the first two 
constraints by complicating identification and weapons employment.  All three of these 
constraints created operational problems that U.S. technology solved.41 
One other aspect of this low-risk dynamic is the question of whether OAF would 
have occurred at all had the technology used by the United States not been available.  
Following Kosovo, arguments that high-technology weapons systems and associated 
“bloodless wars” lowered public tolerance for collateral damage.  If this is indeed the 
case, then the converse is necessarily true:  high-technology weapons systems allow 
leaders to rally support for military action by emphasizing the capability to achieve 
national goals without unacceptable collateral damage.  This argument applies to OAF:  
the NATO allies could survive domestic political pressure only through the promise of 
low-risk operations by using high-technology airpower. 
OAF introduced another round of improvements in military technology.  This 
campaign saw the first use of the B-2 stealth bomber with its weather penetrating ground 
mapping radar; the GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) able to guide 
independently to its target; and the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) providing 
long-term, low-risk, and real-time reconnaissance.  In addition, other technologies 
introduced in Desert Storm matured and were in abundant supply including fighter-
capable versions of night vision goggles, JSTARS, and laser-designating targeting pods 
capable of guiding laser-guided munitions. 
In the development of the OAF coalition, time played a much different role than 
in Desert Storm.  On one hand, all combat participants belonged to NATO countries and 
therefore had trained and exercised together for over 40 years.  On the other hand, the 
actual individual units who deployed into theater had not necessarily trained with the 
                                                 
41 For a discussion of the politically imposed constraints and the resulting operational and tactical 
impacts see Lambeth, 101-177; and Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile 
Campaign in Kosovo, 92-95;  
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other nations.  There was little time between the start of deployment and the initiation of 
operations offering little time for the in-theater forces to establish working relationships 
with the other nations’ units. In fact, not all participating forces had arrived in theater 
before the start of operations.42 
Therefore, time prior to the campaign was not sufficient to provide the mitigation 
function as it did in Desert Storm.  Instead, time provided a forcing function.  
Interoperability problems led to decisions about whether or not to use capability rather 
than how to optimize interoperability.  Had time been available, commanders would have 
had the luxury to delay “use or lose” decisions while work-arounds or fixes could be 
formed. 
 
E.   ROADMAP 
Three trends emerge indicating that technological supremacy predisposes 
coalitional structures to follow the advantaged nation’s warfighting model.  First, 
coalition leadership responsibilities shift disproportionately to the technologically 
advantaged force.  Second, as the technologically advantaged force assumes greater 
leadership responsibility, the coalition assumes the advantaged force’s operational culture 
at the expense of alternative methods, strategies, or avenues of attack used by other 
supporting nations.  Third, time constraints create incentives for resolving technology 
disparities within the coalition that exacerbate the first two trends.  While the 
assumptions leading to these hypotheses are somewhat artificial in that they isolate 
political and economic factors contributing to the U.S. leadership role, systemic trends in 
coalition burden sharing, technological reliance, and operational culture indicate that U.S. 
technological supremacy was sufficient to determine that these coalitions adopt the U.S. 
model of war fighting.   
Chapter II supports the first proposition by arguing that technological advantage 
within a technologically asymmetric coalition necessarily accrues a disproportionate 
share of leadership responsibilities and combat burden to the advantaged force.  In both 
Desert Storm and OAF, a low tolerance for risk was manifested in a framework of 
                                                 
42 Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo, 31-35 and 
Kosovo After-Action Report, 1-3. 
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constraints aimed at minimizing collateral damage and limiting friendly exposure.  U.S. 
technology allowed the coalitions to reduce risk without having to modify their 
objectives.  Reliance on this technology shifted the operational and tactical burden in 
many areas to the United States, including force protection, night and all-weather 
operations, precision-guided munitions, high-speed maneuver, and intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance.   
Disproportionate burden-sharing and associated leadership responsibility creates a 
war-fighting paradigm built around the technologically advantaged force.  Chapter III 
analyzes airpower employment, command and control structures, and information access 
in both operations uncovering a U.S. war-fighting paradigm imposed by its technological 
advantage.  The systems the United States contributed to each coalition relegated the 
technologically deficient allies to the margins as the coalition relied on U.S. technologies 
and their associated tactics.  Alternative tactics and systems incompatible with U.S. 
systems were either isolated or excluded from operations. 
Interestingly, time emerges as an intervening variable that provided both 
mitigating and forcing functions with regard to technology asymmetry and 
interoperability issues.  Chapter IV explores the mitigating effects on interoperability 
provided by the five months of preparation afforded to the Desert Storm coalition.  In 
contrast, the OAF coalition suffered from very little preparation time resulting in even 
greater deference to U.S. technology.  In both cases, at the start of tactical operations, the 
lack of additional time to troubleshoot interoperability issues forced commanders to make 
use or lose decisions regarding assets and technologies incompatible with the coalition as 
a whole. 
This study concludes by distilling the systemic trends derived from three 
propositions discussed above.  Technological asymmetries resulting from reliance on 
U.S. technology advantage created structural elements in both coalitions that shifted 
burden and risk to the United States.  Coalition reliance on U.S. technology contributed 




II. RISK, TECHNOLOGY ADVANTAGE AND DIVISIONS OF 
LABOR: COALITION LEADERSHIP ROLES 
During any combat operation, political leaders, commanders and soldiers seek 
strategies and methods that decrease the likelihood of failure.  U.S. Department of 
Defense defines risk as, “probability and severity of loss linked to hazards.”43  Risk 
defines relationship between the known prior to a conflict and the uncertainty of the 
future.  Risk is a variable controlled by commanders that modulates planning and 
preparation.  Tolerance for greater risk allows pursuit of more difficult objectives with 
fewer resources.  Less risk demands more resources to ensure the objective is met. 
During Desert Storm and OAF, the coalitions defined risk in primarily in terms of 
men and material, collateral damage, and political capital.   Risk was a pre-war planning 
variable that determined the numbers of troops sent to theater, the assets committed to 
meet objectives, and time dedicated to preparation.  Advanced military technologies 
offered these coalitions a means to decrease risk without a proportional increase in men 
and material.  These were U.S. technologies Secretary of Defense William Perry 
described as “revolutionary military systems” developed in the 1970s and deployed in the 
1980s as “force multipliers to counter the perceived three to one disadvantage to the 
Soviets.”44   
These revolutionary systems dazzled the coalition: stealth aircraft, satellite 
imagery, precise navigation systems, night vision goggles and defense suppression 
capabilities.  They all offered the coalition the means to reduce risk to levels defendable 
to the voters back home and the world community in general.  The desire to reduce risk, 
however, created a reliance on these technologies, which were provided almost 
exclusively by the United States.  While reducing the myriad forms of risk is always a 
challenge for commanders, the implications of risk reduction was manifest in the division 
of labor among coalition members.  This chapter answers the question: what effect does 
technological asymmetry have on coalition burden sharing and leadership roles? 
                                                 
43 JP 1-02, 462. 
44 William J. Perry, 1992. "Desert Storm and Deterrence in the Future," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and 
Roger  K. Smith (eds.), After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War, New York: Madison Books:  241-264. 
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This chapter analyzes the relationship between coalition reliance on U.S. 
technologies to reduce operational risk and the diversion of combat burden and leadership 
responsibilities to U.S. forces.  The first section uncovers three conditions present in both 
conflicts that contributed to coalition reliance on U.S. technologies to reduce the 
aggregate risk to the coalition:  the desire to reduce international and domestic political 
risk through expansive multilateral operations; robust enemy military capability; and 
hypersensitivity to friendly losses and collateral damage.  All three of these conditions 
produced operational constraints aimed at reducing risk.  These risk-reducing constraints, 
however, added pressure to operations in the form of increased risks of friendly-fire 
incidents, increased combat risks to allied forces, and more-stringent requirements for 
weapons employment.  U.S. technology offered commanders the means to meet 
operational objectives within these risk-reduction constraints.   
The second section considers technologies not necessarily employed to reduce 
risk but that provided such an asymmetric advantage it produced a similar reliance on 
them.  Whether for risk reduction or asymmetric advantage, the coalitions developed such 
a dependence on these U.S.-exclusive technologies that they assigned a disproportionate 
share of combat burden and leadership responsibility to the United States.  The last 
section collates the data from the first two sections to discern a systemic relationship 
between technological advantage within a coalition and burden sharing and leadership 
responsibility. 
The reliance on U.S. technologies to reduce aggregate risk and produce force 
advantage for the coalition contributed to the United States’ leadership role.  This is not 
to say that U.S. technologies alone forced the allies to cede all leadership responsibilities 
to the Unites States.  Certainly, the sheer capacity of American forces contributed 
immensely to its role as a coalition leader.  The point is that over-riding risk reduction 
constraints created such a dependence on U.S.-exclusive technologies that the United 
States would have been assigned a similar leadership role even if the size of its 
contribution equaled that of the allies.  U.S. technological advantage was a sufficient 




A. THREE CONDITIONS FORCING TECHNOLOGY RELIANCE 
Three conditions emerge as contributing factors leading the allies to rely on U.S. 
technologies.  The first condition is the desire to reduce international and domestic 
political risk by assembling a multinational force to meet the political objectives of the 
coalition.  The diverse capabilities and experiences of the forces assembled instantly 
created interoperability and cooperation issues that increased the risk of friendly fire 
incidents.  The second condition involved enemy threats to the coalition.  The robust air 
defense systems employed by Iraq and Serbia presented coalition forces with formidable 
operational and tactical challenges increasing the risk to friendly forces and operational 
objectives.  The third condition also derived from political concerns for risk to lives.  
Sensitivity to the risks of collateral damage and the loss of friendly troops introduced 
constraints on operations that forced a reliance of technology to meet strategic and 
operational objectives.  Each of these conditions contributed to risk-conscious 
dependence on U.S.-provided technologies that produced two results: increased burden 
and risk to U.S. forces and greater leadership responsibility for the United States. 
These conditions would not necessarily have led to failure had the technologies 
not been available.  Each did present a significant challenge, however, that would have 
increased the duration of the conflict, increased losses, or both.  The availability of a 
capability to mitigate the negative ramifications of these conditions led to a reliance on 
technologies not possessed by all members, thus creating a technology disparity within 
the coalition.     
 
1. Coalitions and Deconfliction 
In Desert Storm and OAF, the diverse membership of the coalition increased 
potential for friendly fire incidents.  Multinational forces, working together for the first 
time in many cases, experienced the friction of coalition operations from the outset.  
Differences in tactics, doctrine, training, and equipment require a period of transition to 
allow interoperability issues to be worked out.  Desert Storm and OAF were no exception 
and the different technologies embodied in these coalitions highlight the difficulties of 
forming effective coalition operations. 
20 
U.S. technologies, however, presented a particularly challenging scenario for 
interoperability and combined operations.  In particular, technologies emphasizing speed 
and maneuver through long-range surveillance and identification and beyond-visual-
range (BVR) weapon employment increased potential for friendly fire incidents.  The 
complex procedures associated with BVR operations pile additional risk on these 
training-intensive operations. 
In Desert Storm, longer firing ranges for ground based artillery and armor 
combined with an increased battle pace placed identification of targets and situational 
awareness at a premium.45  While a combination of technologies available to U.S. and 
British forces allowed identification beyond normal visual ranges, in adverse weather, 
and at night, the potential for friendly forces to stray into areas of responsibility assigned 
to other coalition units was high, increasing the risk of friendly fire incidents.46   
Communications equipment combined with navigation accuracy provided by the 
U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) allowed ground units and command and control 
centers constantly to remain aware of friendly positions.  Not all members of the 
coalition, however, had access to this equipment: a disparity existed in both the types of 
identification and communications equipment and their uses.47 
To minimize fratricide incidents, the coalition implemented a series of risk-
mitigating measures.  First, Desert Storm war plans used geographical separation to 
isolate disparate forces allowing U.S. and some European forces to capitalize on common 
training and execute AirLand Battle doctrine without the friction of including forces 
unfamiliar with the doctrine.48  The challenges of multi-national and multi-lingual forces 
navigating in a featureless desert, however, required additional effort.  The United States 
provided 115 super-high frequency satellite terminals and 33 multi-channel satellite 
                                                 
45 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 675.  
46 MLRS could travel at speeds up to 40 mph and weapons ranges of approx 20 nm; M1A1 could 
cruise at 30 mph and fire a variety of weapons with reported engagement ranges out to 2 nm.  See Conduct 
of the Persian Gulf War, 832-834 and Cordesman and Wagner, 694-697. 
47 GPS provided positional accuracy on the order of 16-25 meters, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 
677-678 and 875; Cordesman and Wagner, 265-266.  
48 Cordesman and Wagner, 561. 
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terminals to non-U.S. coalition members in an effort to improve command and control 
(C2) and, therefore, separation and awareness among the dissimilar coalition forces.49 
To improve navigation issues in the interest of keeping units within their areas of 
responsibility, the United States acquired and shipped as many GPS receivers as possible 
into theater.  Running at full production capacity over the six months leading up to the 
start of the war, the United States sent more than 5,000 military and commercial receivers 
into theater.  In addition, Saudi and European partners acquired more than 2,500 
receivers.  Due to the number of coalition partners using GPS, the United States chose to 
disable GPS encrypting that would have otherwise denied the enemy from deriving the 
same GPS navigation benefits.50  
An analogous airborne situation existed in both Desert Storm and OAF.  Large 
numbers of aircraft transiting a relatively small volume of airspace presented challenges 
for fratricide and collision avoidance.  Tracking systems and air-to-air missiles provided 
some fighters the capability to locate, track, and shoot airborne targets well beyond visual 
identification ranges.51  Electronic Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems installed on 
almost all aircraft mitigated this problem but not all partners possessed compatible IFF 
systems.   
In the Desert Storm case, some coalition members had been suppliers of Iraqi 
military equipment in years past meaning some Iraqi equipment was similar to, if not 
identical to, coalition equipment.52  Technologically, disparate types of equipment in the 
form of weapons and identification systems presented a challenge for air operations.53 
The primary solution to this technological disparity involved a work-around to 
compensate for the disparate IFF capabilities.54  The Joint Forces Air Component 
                                                 
49 Cordesman and Wagner, 561. 
50 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 875-877. 
51 For a brief description of aerial detection, identification, intercept and engagement tactics see Gulf 
War Air Power Survey, Volume IV, 141-142. 
52 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 594. 
53 Inadequate IFF for ground and air forces was identified as a shortcoming, Ibid., 606. 
54 Zanini, et al., define a work-around as a solution to an incompatibility that reduces the effects of the 
incompatibility but does not necessarily solve it.  This is compared to a fix which eliminates an 
incompatibility by solving it at its roots.  Zanini, et al, 30. 
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Commander (JFACC)55 implemented rules of engagement establishing strict criteria for 
air-to-air engagement.  Only aircraft with the capability to interrogate autonomously all 
types of IFF could formally designate an aircraft as an enemy without visual 
confirmation.  This work-around increased the risk to fighters by either forcing them 
either to wait for other aircraft, such as the AWACS C2 and surveillance platform, or 
approach to within visual identification range.56   
Only the U.S. F-15C, F-14 and AWACS aircraft had the capability to identify 
enemy aircraft beyond visual range.57 As indicated by coalition aerial kills in Desert 
Storm, the U.S. F-15C enjoyed considerable technological advantage in theater.  While 
flying only 33% of counter-air missions, the U.S. F-15C earned 34 of 41 aerial kills 
(83%).58   One of two conclusions derives from these statistics: either the U.S. F-15C was 
the superior air-to-air fighter in theater, or the coalition leadership considered it to be 
superior despite its actual capabilities.  The former draws a direct connection between its 
superior capabilities and its superior kill ratio.  The latter case implies war planners 
considered it the superior asset and therefore placed it in scenarios most likely to engage 
with enemy fighters.  In either case, the technology advantage enjoyed by the U.S. F-
15C, whether real or perceived, led to the United States accepting primary responsibility 
for counter-air defense.   
Ironically, the political successes that brought together forces from so many states 
created a technological disparity within the coalition that increased risk to its forces. Had 
the coalition divided labor among participants equally, the potential for friendly fire 
incidents and the risk to forces less capable than United States may have been greater.  
To mitigate this risk, the coalition implemented a number of work-arounds in the form of 
rules of engagement (ROE), technology patches, communication equipment, and system 
degradations.  While the technology, such as long-range air-to-air weapons, provided by 
                                                 
55 CJFACC in OAF. 
56 From this author’s experience, this was 6000-12000’ depending on the size of the target aircraft and 
the geometry of the intercept.  These ranges are well within the lethal ranges of enemy fighters in both 
campaigns. 
57 See Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume V, 653-654 for the list of Desert Storm aerial kills.  For a 
description of the F-15C, F-14, and AWACS, see Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume IV, 106-108, 
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 772-774, 780-782, and 778-780.  
58 Derived from Tables 64 and 96, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume V, pages 232-233 and 335. 
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the Unites States may have contributed to an increase in risk, the United States provided 
the work-arounds in each case to reduce risk to acceptable levels.  The work-arounds, 
however, created a reliance on U.S. capabilities that increased combat burden and 
leadership responsibilities for American forces.    
 
2. Integrated Air Defense 
Enemy air-defense systems created the second condition emphasizing 
technological disparities that created a reliance on U.S. systems.  The French-built, Iraqi 
KARI integrated air defense system (IADS) harmonized Iraqi surface and air counter-air 
forces through a centralized command and control system.  Both air and ground shooters 
included capable Soviet built systems including the Mig-25 and Mig-29 fighters;  SA-2, 
SA-3, and SA-6 medium and long range surface-to-air missile systems (SAM); short-
range, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS); guided and unguided anti-air 
artillery (AAA) batteries; and the French Mirage F-1 fighter and ROLAND SAM 
systems.  The KARI system also incorporated redundant command and control 
capability; underground, fiber-optic communications; and robust early warning capability 
including radar systems and observations posts.59  Iraq’s KARI system presented a 
formidable challenge for coalition air operations. 
Serbia’s air defense also presented a challenge for coalition air operations, 
although for slightly different reasons.  While not nearly as robust as the KARI system in 
1990, Serbia’s air defense system benefited from the lessons of Desert Storm and the 
subsequent 1998 operation, Desert Fox.  Serbian tactics sought to attrit enemy air forces 
by conservatively employing surface-to-air shooters and placing priority on their 
survival.  Serbia’s SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 SAM systems operated more autonomously than 
Iraq’s and used shoot-and-run tactics to deny coalition forces the opportunity to locate 
and engage them.  In addition to the SAMs, Serbian AAA and MANPADS presented a 
significant threat for low flying aircraft as well.  Despite employment of Soviet Mig-29s, 
Serbia’s airborne air defense was nominal at best.60 
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In both coalitions, only the United States possessed the capabilities to face these 
threats.  Eliminating the Iraqi and Serbian air threat involved not only beating the threat 
the aircraft presented, but also doing so within the fratricide-prevention constraints 
established by the coalition JFACC.  In Desert Storm, air-to-air kill statistics prove the 
U.S. fighters’ dominance in this role: of the 41 total kills, the United States claimed all 
but two.  The non-U.S. kills, both by the same pilot on the same sortie, required 
American AWACS for intercept geometry, identification, and authorization to shoot.61  
In Kosovo, U.S. fighters shot down five Serb fighters while a Dutch fighter had the only 
other kill.62  Within the constraints imposed to prevent fratricide, the capability to 
identify and target aircraft at long range belonged exclusively to United States counter-air 
assets.   
Using Steve Metz’s taxonomy, the technology disparity in both coalitions 
involved both reliance on and uses of technology.  Superior U.S. capability caused a 
disproportionate shift in responsibility for the air superiority phase of the battle to U.S. air 
power.  In Desert Storm, only U.S. AWACS handled surveillance and early warning in 
the theater of operations while Saudi and NATO AWACS conducted strictly defensive 
surveillance missions.63  U.S. aircraft flew 85% of all strike/attack/counter air sorties 
with 75% of the combat aircraft in theater.64  As the air-to-air kill statistics indicate, 
however, sortie rates do not accurately reflect the assumption of risk or preponderance of 
capability.  While coalition aircraft flew many of the counter air sorties, these sorties 
were more often defensive combat air patrols flown outside of Kuwait and Iraq or were 
strike sorties targeting air defense forces on the ground.65 
It was the SAM threat that most plagued coalition air forces in both conflicts.  
Two elements of mission structure resulted from the threat presented by enemy IADS:   
 
                                                 
61 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 594-595. 
62 Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 69. 
63 Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume IV, 97-98. 
64 Cordesman and Wagner, 377 and Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume V, 232-233.   
65 Gulf War Air Power Survey statistics make it difficult to discern specifically which sorties were 
OCA sweep missions tasked to engage Iraqi fighters in Iraq.  OCA sorties combine SEAD, air-to-surface 
attacks on air defense sights, and fighter sweep in the Gulf War Air Power Survey numbers.  
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the use of stealth aircraft and cruise missiles for deep and high risk strikes and the heavy 
reliance on electronic warfare (EW) and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) for 
force protection.66   
Stealth aircraft offered coalition planners the option of assigning manned aircraft 
to strike heavily defended targets without having to eliminate or suppress enemy air 
defenses before hand.  Both the F-117 and B-2 aircraft provided war planners with the 
ability to strike heavily defended targets using precision-guided munitions without having 
to assign escorts for counter air and counter air defense roles.67  
Cruise missiles including the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), 
Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM), and Standoff Land Attack Missile 
(SLAM) offered similarly difficult-to-detect weapons systems that fly autonomously for 
hundreds of miles to strike targets deep in enemy territory.68  The Joint Standoff Weapon 
(JSOW), while still in limited quantities, added an additional standoff, GPS-guided 
weapon to the U.S.’s OAF arsenal.69  Coalition planners in both conflicts opted to use 
these systems to strike targets in heavily defended areas such as Baghdad in Iraq and 
Belgrade in Serbia.70 
Stealth aircraft and cruise missiles, however, were in short supply for both 
campaigns.  Coalition planners still required non-stealth combat aircraft to fly through 
SAM threats to accomplish their objectives. To protect more-vulnerable combat aircraft, 
planners “packaged” aircraft into mission groups combining various aircraft with various 
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capabilities in order to optimize survivability.  Air combat fighters, EW and SEAD 
aircraft escorted more-vulnerable strike aircraft in order to defend them from the air 
defense threat.71 
The SEAD and EW technologies available to each of the partners presented a 
significant disparity.  The British Air Launched Anti-Radiation Missile (ALARM) used 
by the British RAF was in many senses more capable than the U.S. High-Speed Anti-
Radiation Missiles (HARM) missiles used by the U.S., German and Italian SEAD 
aircraft.  In Desert Storm, however, only the United States had airborne detection and 
location capabilities.72  In OAF, German and Italian Tornados had both detection and 
location capabilities, but U.S. F-16CJ and RC-135’s combined with datalink capabilities 
and a more advanced version of the HARM established a significant SEAD asymmetry 
independent of the numbers deployed into theater.73 
The asymmetry in counter-air defense technologies ultimately led to a 
disproportionate shift in combat burden to U.S. forces.  In Desert Storm, U.S. aircraft 
accounted for all but 80 EW sorties (2,842) and all of the 4,326 SEAD sorties.74 The 
United States expended 1,964 HARMs compared to the British RAF expending 112 of its 
ALARMs.75  In OAF, U.S. forces accounted for 60% of the aircraft in theater but flew 
88% of the SEAD sorties and nearly all of the EW sorties.76  The credible threat 
presented by the Serbian IADS and the vulnerability of the coalition aircraft forced 
upwards of 30% of the aircraft in each package to be dedicated to EW and SEAD.77   
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The presence of U.S. technologies combining sensor, platform and weapon 
capabilities into an integrated force protection force allowed the coalition in both 
conflicts to exploit the air with relatively low resistance.  In the absence of these 
technologies, the struggle for air supremacy would have taken much longer and cost 
many more lives.  The availability of these capabilities, however, created a reliance on 
them, leading the United States to assume a disproportionate share of the counter-air 
defense burden and the risk inherent in establishing a permissive air environment for 
coalition operations. 
 
3. Risk Tolerance Forcing Technology Reliance 
Operation Allied Force provides an excellent example of the dynamic between 
risk and technology.  All 19 NATO nations contributed to OAF with 14 actually 
providing forces for the operation.78  Despite continuous rhetoric claiming that a ground 
presence remained a viable option, interviews and data since indicate that NATO never 
seriously considered committing ground troops during the conflict phase of the 
operation.79  Concern for maintaining the integrity of the coalition, specifically fear of 
dwindling domestic support in many participating countries, drove coalition leadership to 
establish ROE that limited the exposure of allied forces to threats and minimized the risk 
of collateral damage.80  
In one interpretation, the coalition’s decision not to commit to a ground option 
reflects its low tolerance for risk to friendly forces.  The U.S. DoD observed in 
Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report: Report to Congress that,  
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In the period leading up to the initiation of the air campaign, there was not 
a consensus in the United States or the alliance to aggressively pursue 
planning for a ground force option in other than a permissive 
environment.81  
As a coalition, using ground troops to stop Serbia’s ethnic cleansing presented too much 
risk to personnel to allow many alliance nations to participate.   
As an alternative, air power offered the strategic promise of precise and effective 
operations as seen in Desert Storm less than a decade earlier.  U.S. air power advocates 
claimed that an air-only campaign allowed the coalition to apply coercive force without 
excessive risk or investment.  The choice at the political level appeared to be between a 
broader coalition using low-risk airpower and a smaller coalition willing to commit 
ground forces if necessary.  The coalition opted for the former.  The air-only option 
offered the potential to meet objectives while keeping risk at acceptable levels.     
In choosing this option, political leaders placed coalition unity among the 
strategic objectives.  The Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report states,  
Once NATO commenced offensive operations, it became essential for 
NATO to maintain political consensus and cohesion in order to prevail. 
Maintaining alliance unity then became an overarching strategic objective 
in the offensive phase of the crisis.82 
Air power offered a technological alternative to accomplishing strategic objectives using 
“boots on the ground.”  This option immediately established a technological asymmetry 
within the coalition: only the United States had the capabilities and forces to accomplish 
these objectives through airpower alone.83   
In addition to using air power exclusively, the coalition implemented risk-
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JFACC (CJFACC) established a minimum altitude of 15,000 feet for all combat 
operations.  By staying above this altitude, coalition aircraft reduced their vulnerability to 
small arms and MANPADS.84 
The medium-altitude constraint, however, placed a strain on strike aircraft 
attempting to identify Serbian forces from almost three miles above.  Typically, the 
presence of a tactical air controller on the ground able to assist airborne assets to locate, 
identify, and engage enemy ground forces mitigates this scenario.85  This was the case in 
Desert Storm where U.S. commanders assigned U.S. Forward Air Controllers (FAC), Air 
Liaison Officers (ALO), Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP), special forces, and Air 
Naval Gunfire Liaisons to non-U.S. ground units to facilitate ground-air coordination.86  
OAF’s air-only war eliminated this option.87 
Operations from this altitude also limited the accuracy of standard, unguided 
weapons decreasing effectiveness and increasing the risk of collateral damage.  The 
fallout from the damage to the Chinese embassy in Belgrade provides one example of the 
negative effects of collateral damage the coalition sought to avoid.88  Moreover, Serbia 
proved to be adept at exploiting the media by using scenes of collateral damage, some of 
it staged, as propaganda.89  Resulting ROE established strict guidelines for weapons 
employment and forced planners to increase their reliance on precision guided munitions 
(PGM).  
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Poor weather conditions in OAF further exacerbated weapons’ accuracy and 
collateral damage concerns.90  Non-U.S. combat aircraft did not have the technology to 
locate or identify targets on the ground through clouds.  Collateral damage concerns 
prevented employment through clouds without the means to find and locate targets.  
Furthermore, many of the targets were not static.  Serbian ground forces demonstrated a 
willingness and expertise at hiding from coalition aircraft, using decoys to divert 
coalition weapons, and using civilians as shields.91  
Only the United States possessed the capability to “see” through the weather.  
JSTARS provided ground surveillance functions using ground-mapping radars to find 
Serb forces and track moving targets.92  Unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, such as the 
U.S. Predator, permitted surveillance missions to fly below the 15,000 foot minimum 
altitude restriction for location and identification purposes.  As an unmanned vehicle, the 
Predator allowed lower altitude flights without increasing the risk to coalition 
personnel.93 
The B-2 stealth bombers also used internal ground-mapping radars to precisely 
locate its targets.  The B-2 also employed GPS-guided JDAM, which was capable of 
autonomously guiding to its target using internal GPS receivers.  Other PGMs required 
operators to guide the weapon to the target using a laser designator or locking the weapon 
on the target with imaging technology.94 
As alluded to by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson in a speech following 
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From precision-guided weapons and all-weather aircraft to ground troops 
that can get to the crisis quickly and then stay there with adequate 
logistical support, the European Allies did not have enough of the right 
stuff.95 
Without the capability to operate within the constraints established by the coalition 
leadership, the rest of the coalition effectively shifted the burden of strike 
disproportionately to the United States.  A glance at the numbers and types of aircraft 
contributed by all NATO participants offers the first indications of the technology 
disparity among the allies. By the end of the air operation, of the 1,022 total aircraft 
committed, the United States provided 720, or 70%.96  Of 38,004 total coalition sorties, 
U.S. aircraft flew 30,018, or 78%.97 
Weapons expenditures provide another example of burden shifting 
disproportionately to the U.S. technological advantage.  Of the 28,018 weapons 
expended, the United States expended 83%.98  Approximately 8,500, or 30%, of these 
munitions were precision-guided,99 of which, the United States employed 6,728 or 
approximately 80%.100  In some estimates, PGMs accounted for 74% of targets 
destroyed.101  Of course, NATO allies did contribute in a myriad of other ways, such as 
basing and logistics.  However, from a technology perspective, the policies intended to 
reduce risk to coalition aircrew built a requirement for technology that only the United 
States could provide in substance. 
The B-2, JDAM, JSTARS, and Predator represented U.S. technologies capable of 
mitigating issues created by ROE and procedure intended to reduce the risk to coalition 
personnel a civilians.  Without them, the coalition would have had to choose between not 
committing to the operation at all and accepting higher levels of risk to coalition 
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personnel.  Instead, the availability of U.S. technologies allowed the coalition to execute 
operations within the established risk parameters.  In doing so, however, the burden for 
these operations shifted disproportionately to the United States.  Paraphrasing Maj Gen 
Short, William Drozdiak claimed,  
Short said that since allied strategy demanded highly accurate bombing at 
night, he could not afford to take the risk of sending the warplanes of 
many European nations on missions that were deemed too risky -- out of 
concern for the pilots and for civilian casualties that might result from 
errant bombing.102 
Even in the case of long-range surveillance like JSTARS and unmanned vehicles like 
Predator, while the risk to personnel was not present, U.S. forces assumed the risk to U.S. 
equipment and the cost to operate them. 
The coalition in Desert Storm assembled with more agreement and coherence 
than did the coalition in OAF.  In Desert Storm, overwhelming support from the world 
community and resultant agreement on political and strategic objectives established 
coalition cohesiveness that allowed a higher tolerance for risk.  Furthermore, significant 
U.S. commitment up front established a more mission-oriented coalition less conscious of 
international and domestic political risks. 
This does not mean that this coalition accepted all risks equally.  Like OAF, risk 
reduction measures implemented by coalition commanders also resulted in reliance on 
technology measures.  For example, the coalition limited aerial attacks of Baghdad, the 
most heavily defended air sector in Iraq, to two weapons systems, the F-117 and the 
TLAM, and only the latter during daytime operations.103  Therefore, the United States 
assumed all risk for personnel attacking targets all responsibility for collateral damage for 
targets in Baghdad. 
The U.S. AirLand Battle doctrine involved close coordination between air power 
and ground maneuver units.  Emphasizing speed and agility, U.S. maneuver units relied 
heavily on training, doctrine, standardization and communications to allow air operations 
close to friendly forces without increasing the risk of fratricide.  By taking coalition lead 
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in planning and execution, the U.S. AirLand Battle became the template for execution.104   
While five months of preparation afforded coalition forces to exercise coalition partners 
and train up TACP of their own, the United States ultimately provided liaison teams to 
each coalition partner down to the battalion level and provided almost all of the Close Air 
Support (CAS) missions.105    
CAS involves complex communications, doctrine, and standardization procedures 
to ensure aircraft flying at hundreds of miles per hour and thousands of feet above the 
ground do not employ weapons on friendly troops.  Anthony Cordesman argues that the 
assumption of the CAS mission by U.S. air power was no accident, 
This emphasis on U.S. air power reflected the superior precision-strike and 
close air support mission orientation of U.S. aircraft, but it was also a 
matter of [Command, Control, Computers, Communication, Intelligence 
and Battle Management] capability.  The U.S. found it far easier to control 
its own aircraft in what became a far more complex air combat 
environment the moment that strike/attack aircraft had to engage in 
combined operations and also found it easier to use this control to reduce 
the risk of fratricide.106 
The number of nations participating with such diverse levels and type of training 
presented a challenge to the high-speed maneuver war that the United States planned to 
execute.  Only the United States had the combination of all the assets required to execute 
such a complex mission.  Once again, superior U.S. technology in weapons, aircraft, and 
command and control allowed the United States to solve the tactical problem presented 
by the diverse membership of the coalition.  
 
B. UNFORCED ADVANTAGES 
Coalition reliance on U.S. technologies derived in part from measures taken to 
reduce risk.  Theoretically, the absence of these constraints would have allowed coalition 
partners a greater role in operations.  Certain technological advantages possessed by the 
United States unassociated with political conditions, however, also led to reliance on 
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high-technology weapons possessed by only one or a few coalition members.  The 
technological asymmetries in these cases reinforced the technological advantage provided 
by the United States, further contributing to its leadership role. 
Ground combat in Desert Storm proved the value of beyond-visual-range and 
night-imaging devices.  Combined with long-range weapons systems such as the 
Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and the long detection and employment ranges 
of the M1A1 Abrams tank, thermal imaging systems allowed the detection, identification 
and engagement of targets outside the lethal ranges of Iraqi forces.  Once again, few had 
these capabilities for the war.  Not even all U.S. forces employed these advanced 
technologies.107   
Coalition planners accounted for the disparity in capabilities by organizing the 
coalition forces by matching nations and capabilities to objectives.  Planners used the 
high-speed, high-technology forces for the flanking maneuvers to the west.  U.S. and 
other multi-national units with less capability engaged in breeching operations into 
Kuwait.  The more advanced forces capable of executing high-speed, integrated 
operations allowed the western flank to cover much greater distances in a short time in 
order to cut off Iraqi forces fleeing north from Kuwait.108 
Even light and capable units suffered from technological deficiencies that limited 
their contributions.  The French 6th Light Armored Brigade supported the western effort 
attached to the U.S. Army XVIII Corps but they lacked the night imaging capability and 
long-range artillery to be effective against the more robust Iraqi forces.109  Therefore, the 
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Army’s XVIII corps as it sped to cut off the Iraqi forces fleeing north.110  The United 
States even had to augment the French force with 4500 troops from the U.S. 82nd 
Airborne Division.111 
The British 1st Armored Division represented the least disparate force within the 
coalition.  Outfitted with thermal imaging capability and GPS navigation, it was able to 
move as rapidly, day and night, as its VII Corp counterparts.112  Technological 
compatibility with U.S. forces enabled the 1st Armored Division to maneuver with the 
U.S. 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) including moving through its positions at 
night.113  British forces still required augmentation from a U.S. National Guard MLRS 
unit for long-range artillery support.114   
The differences in responsibilities and assignments during the ground operations 
represented the technological disparity within the coalition.  The U.S. Army possessed 
quicker forces with longer-range capability and the ability to operate day and night.  
These capabilities relegated these forces to western operations requiring high-speed to 
cover the longer distances required in the western flanking maneuver.  Less quick 
coalition partners, including the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force with older armor and 
artillery, were assigned the breeching operations and shorter distances into Kuwait.  
Another example of U.S. technological advantage involves its exclusive 
contribution of heavy bombers.  For example, B-52 bombers in Desert Storm represented 
only three percent of the combat aircraft in theater yet delivered approximately 30% of 
the bomb tonnage.115  This aircraft and the devastation they delivered produced, by itself, 
the surrender of Iraqi ground forces.116  The long range and heavy payloads provided the 
coalition with overwhelming firepower delivered nearly unencumbered from high above 
the threat. 
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The B-2 represents a U.S. technological advantage in many areas of force 
application.  From a force projection perspective, the B-2 demonstrated the ability to 
take-off in Kansas, strike targets in Serbia, and land back in Kansas on a single sortie.  
This bomber proved an authentic, global power projection capability.117  During OAF, it 
carried up to sixteen, 2,000 pound, GPS-guided JDAM allowing it to hit sixteen different 
targets within meters on a single pass.118   
The heavy bomber represents a capability pursued by few countries worldwide.  
No U.S. allies possess this combination of range and payload.  Capable of delivering 
long-range cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions, these aircraft provide war 
planners force-multiplying effects at all levels of war.  Within both Desert Storm and 
OAF, these aircraft shifted burden and risk to the United States creating a reliance on 
their ability to deliver concentrated mass thereby accelerating the progress of operations. 
 
C. SYSTEMIC TRENDS 
Conditions external and internal to the coalition created operational pressures U.S. 
technologies could relieve.  These technologies created an asymmetry within the 
coalition, forcing specific structural mechanisms to develop.  Table 1 lays out the 
conditions that led to reliance on technologies provided almost exclusively by the United 
States, which in turn created technological asymmetries.  These asymmetries produced 
structural elements within the coalition that shifted burden and risk to U.S. forces 
requiring the United States to accept responsibility for these mission areas. 
The large and multi-national nature of these coalitions created the first condition: 
large forces working within defined spaces using weapons systems with the potential to 
kill beyond ranges that forces are able to identify.  The use of various types of weapons 
systems and platforms adds to uncertainty for a shooter less familiar with the vehicles and 
aircraft of another nation.  This scenario leads to a high potential for friendly fire.   
In response, the United States provided technologies to mitigate the risk.  For 
ground forces, a combination of GPS receivers, satellite communication (SATCOM) 
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radios, and geographic separation reduced friendly-fire potential.  Effective adherence to 
geographic responsibilities, however, required U.S. assets and the disabling of GPS 
encryption.  For air forces, strict rules of engagement restricted the employment of 
weapons beyond visual range.  Only U.S. forces possessed the capability to identify the 
enemy beyond visual range leading to a reliance on U.S. command and control assets for 
long range engagements.  In both cases, coalition leadership accepted an increased risk 
from enemy forces in order to reduce the risk of friendly fire incidents. 
 
Table 1.   Technological Asymmetry Causal Relationship Trace 
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The second condition, robust enemy air-defense networks, originated external to 
the coalition.  In both conflicts, the United States provided technologies to mitigate the 
risk to coalition aircraft:  stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, suppression aircraft, and BVR 
counter-air capability.  Each of these allowed the coalition as a whole to enjoy air 
supremacy in relatively short order while U.S. assets assumed the bulk of the risk to men 
and materiel.  War planners organized coalition missions with U.S. assets executing the 
riskiest missions and packaged other coalition aircraft with protective U.S. assets on the 
less risky missions. 
In both coalitions, requirements to reduce risk, both to friendly forces and 
civilians, created operational and tactical challenges that U.S. technology could 
overcome.  In OAF, rules of engagement requiring coalition aircrew to remain at medium 
altitudes forced a reliance on U.S. sensors that could locate and identify targets on the 
ground and weapons that could guide to their targets autonomously.  In Desert Storm, the 
high-speed and integrated operations of the AirLand battle required that U.S. assets take 
lead for close air support on the ground and fly nearly all CAS sorties through the 
operation.  In both conflicts, collateral damage concerns forced a reliance on weapons 
capable of consistently guiding to within meters of their targets. 
In addition to constraint-driven technology reliance, certain technologies created 
reliance simply due to their superior capabilities.  On the ground, high-speed armor, 
night-vision capability, and long-range artillery led war planners to assign responsibilities 
based on capability.  More capable, quicker forces handled the more complex operations 
while less capable forces received less complex assignments.   
In the air, the same held true.  The availability of U.S. high-technology sensors, 
heavy bombers, and precision guided munitions shifted operational and tactical burdens 
to the United States.  Shifts in burden include shifts in risk as well, both in the form of 
risk to friendly forces and risk of collateral damage responsibility.  In both OAF and 
Desert Storm, the United States accepted a disproportional amount of risk compared to 




whole.  By accepting this risk, the United States implicitly accepted responsibility for 
those mission areas whether they are high-speed ground maneuvers or aerial attacks on 
high-risk targets.   
Burden shifting is the most obvious of the ramifications of U.S. technological 
advantage.  As with the heavy bombers, dynamic of assigning the tough jobs to the most 
capable and the less tough jobs to the less capable inevitably leads to the technologically 
superior U.S. force assuming lead.  John Tirpak quotes Maj Gen Short complaining about 
this phenomena following OAF, 
“I don't think there's any question that we've got an A team and a B team 
now," Short said. Those nations that failed to invest in precision guidance 
or nighttime capabilities or beyond-visual-range systems were "relegated 
to doing nothing but flying combat air patrol in the daytime; that's all they 
were capable of doing.”119 
The A-team, B-team dynamic is not just an issue of assigning the tough missions to the 
best forces; this dynamic possesses political ramifications as well.  In OAF, this approach 
was manifest in the decision to rely strictly on air power rather than risk ground troops.  
The coalition immediately looked to the United States to lead the operation arguably 
because it had the technological capability to meet coalition objectives from the air. 
HRH General Kahled bin Sultan acknowledges the relationship between the 
overwhelming advantage U.S. forces provided to the coalition and the leadership role this 
advantage demanded.  In summarizing the nature of Desert Storm, he alludes to U.S. 
technological advantage, “The Gulf War was something quite different.  On the coalition 
side, the principal actor was a superpower, and the advanced weapons deployed—
satellites, Stealth aircraft, submarine-launched Cruise missiles—were systems only a 
superpower can command.”120  While he spent much effort preserving the leadership role 
of his own country, he admits that his position as Joint Forces Commander ultimately 
subordinated to U.S. leadership,  
                                                 
119 Maj Gen Michael Short as quoted by John A. Tirpak in “Short's View of the Air Campaign: What 
counted most for NATO's success in the Balkans was the reduction of strategic targets, not "tank plinking" 
in Kosovo,” i82 (9) (September, 1999) http://www.afa.org/magazine/sept1999/0999watch_print.html 
(Accessed 10 May 2006). 
120 Bin Sultan, 461. 
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I should perhaps add a word of explanation here about the notion of a 
"parallel command."  It did not, and could not, mean that my command 
and Schwarzkopf's were equivalent: there was no equivalence in the men, 
resources and equipment available to each of us.  In view of its 
overwhelming military contribution to the Coalition, there was little doubt 
that the United States had to make the ultimate command decisions.121 
U.S. forces included such overwhelming advantage compared to the rest of the nations in 
the coalition that they had to accept increased risk and responsibility through the conflict 
and with them, a leadership role. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between technology advantage and leadership within a coalition 
requires a very narrow focus to uncover causal factors.  The state of a military’s 
technological capability links very closely to its budget, which in turn associates to its 
force size.  This budgetary relationship makes a causal connection between technology 
and leadership difficult to discern.  By filtering force size in comparing military 
contributions to a coalition, technological asymmetry emerges as a contributing factor in 
allocating leadership responsibilities.   
This relationship suggests unintended consequences of the U.S. transformation 
effort today.  As the United States continues to pursue leading edge technologies, allied 
nations willing to participate in military coalitions become less capable of fighting along 
side U.S. forces.  Extending the logic slightly, as the United States continues on its 
current technologically oriented transformation trajectory, it will find multi-lateral 
coalitions becoming more unilateral in execution.  Greater technological advantage will 
actually force the United States to accept a greater share of the risk at all levels.  
                                                 
121 Bin Sultan, 193. 
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III. OPERATIONAL CULTURE: TECHNOLOGY ASYMMETRY 
AND UNILATERALISM 
As a coalition assembles, it develops characteristics based its membership, its 
objectives, the adversary, and the political and strategic environment. These 
characteristics define a culture attributable to the coalition as whole that determines its 
operational nature.  This analysis presented in this chapter will describe a coalition’s 
characteristics that define its operational structures as its operational culture.  Operational 
culture refers to the goals, language, organization, rules, values, and limits of the 
coalition as they apply to the conduct of military operations.   
The national forces and capabilities contributed to a coalition help shape its 
operational culture.  As described in Chapter II, a technology asymmetry among coalition 
members will increase combat burden and leadership responsibilities for the 
technologically advantaged partner.  Disproportionate burdens and leadership 
responsibilities create space for the technologically advantaged partner to import its 
operational culture into the coalition.  Mission structures, organization, command 
relationships, doctrine, and standard operating procedures follow the technologically 
superior capabilities. 
This chapter describes the effects of technology asymmetry on the operational 
culture of a coalition.  Focusing on three aspects of the Desert Storm and OAF, this 
chapter demonstrates how U.S. technological advantage facilitated the adoption of U.S. 
operational culture.  Airpower employment, command and control structures, and 
information access created a reliance on U.S. technologies that injected U.S. operational 
culture into the coalition.  This American warfighting paradigm was manifested in 
strategic plans, organizational structures, and communications architectures.  The 
paradigm both reflected and perpetuated U.S. operational culture by reinforcing 
American warfighting concepts and limiting allied participation at the operational level of 
the conflict.  
The first section of this chapter focuses on air power employment in Desert Storm 
and OAF. It describes the process links between technological supremacy, operational 
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culture, and the exclusion of allies from operational and command relationships.  The 
Desert Storm coalition centralized coalition air power under a single U.S. commander, 
the Joint Force Air Component Commander.  General Khaled bin Sultan, among others, 
point to the technologies provided by the United States as causal in its coalition 
leadership.122  The technological superiority of these assets facilitated the implementation 
of the U.S. air strategy named “Instant Thunder,” a phased campaign seeking strategic 
paralysis through simultaneous and parallel attacks on key Iraqi systems.123   
The overwhelming success of this plan was not reflected in OAF, although USAF 
generals attempted to implement a similar coalition air campaign.  In OAF, however, the 
U.S. war plan encountered political resistance from various coalition partners who 
wished to fine tune air operations to meet political sensitivities about collateral damage.  
Unable to target freely in accordance with the American operational concept, the strategic 
air plan stumbled under the coalition’s incremental political objectives.124 
The second section examines coalition operational culture by exploring command 
relationships and control structures.  Command relationships enforce U.S. leadership and 
war fighting style.  In OAF, for example, the United States established separate chains of 
command and air tasking orders (ATOs) to accommodate stealth and cruise missile 
technology security concerns.  In Desert Storm, air power unity of command under the 
JFACC also did not match the parallel command system established for the rest of the 
coalition.  The ATO concept also enforced an American operational environment by 
centralizing control of all air assets and short-circuiting the chain of command from the 
JFACC directly to the sortie generator.  Command relationships and control mechanisms 
created and promoted the U.S. warfighting paradigm that existed in both operations. 
The final section addresses the unique characteristics of information technologies.  
Information operations pose challenges for security and vulnerability that are not present 
                                                 
122 Bin Sultan, 338, 461; and Cordesman and Wagner, 942. 
123 Edward Mann argues that Instant Thunder is the result of USAF doctrinal evolution beginning 
with Guilio Douhet’s command of the air, strategic applications of World War II’s combined bomber 
campaign, and lessons learned from Vietnam’s Rolling Thunder operations.  See Edward C. Mann III, 
1995, Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air 
University Press. 
124 Tirpak, “Short's View of the Air Campaign: What counted most for NATO's success in the 
Balkans was the reduction of strategic targets, not "tank plinking" in Kosovo.” 
43 
with traditional weapons systems.  Sometimes, merely exposing a piece of intelligence 
can reveal the intelligence sources and methods thereby providing unintended insights 
into U.S. information resources.  These types of concerns drive extensive security 
protocols to protect finished intelligence and data fusion resources.  Security measures, 
however, often double as exclusionary measures.  Particularly in OAF, the heavy reliance 
on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and the computer and 
communications systems led to reliance on U.S.-only technologies.  Hence, only the 
Unites States contributed to the operational culture driving the employment of these 
assets. 
As the U.S. military continues to experience an information-driven revolution in 
military affairs, it creates two problems for itself.125  First, coalitions of allies unable to 
field interoperable systems contribute little to the operational nature of the coalition.  
Essentially, the coalition becomes a unilateral enterprise with a few partners adding 
resources only at the margins.  Second, rather than capitalize on a breadth of capabilities 
and perspectives, a coalition will assume the operational culture associated with the 
leading technologies, thereby creating more space for asymmetric threats to find 
weaknesses in the coalition’s strategy. 
 
A. AIRPOWER AND OPERATIONAL CULTURE 
Desert Storm seemed to validate 60 years worth of airpower advocacy in 38 days.  
Air power not only proved its efficacy in major combat, it proved decisive.  General 
Khaled bin Sultan declares, “It was evident that, more than ever before in modern 
military history, control of the air was crucial: it was virtually impossible to fight without 
it.”126  The United States provided 86% of the combat sorties in Desert Storm and 78% in 
                                                 
125 This study assumes the existence of technology-driven RMA, although many scholars still debate 
whether or not this is the case.  The literature on the information-age RMA is extensive; a representative 
sample includes, but is not limited to:, Stephen Biddle 1996, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War 
Tells Us about the Future of Conflict.”  International Security, 21 (2) (Autumn): 139-179: Thomas-Durell 
Young, 2003, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and Coalition Operations: Problem Areas in Solutions.” 
Defense & Security Analysis 19 (June): 111-130; Zanini and Taw, The Army and Multinational Force 
Compatibility; Richard H. Schultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (eds.), 1992,  The Future of Air Power 
in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press; Owens and Offley, 
Lifting the Fog of War; and O'Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare. 
126 Bin Sultan, 345. 
44 
OAF.127  There is little argument that strictly in terms of assets and capabilities, the air 
war in both conflicts was an American show.  Sortie rates and targets destroyed, 
however, do not tell the complete story.  Desert Storm demonstrated a palpable shift in 
the use of air power in major conflict: airpower had finally become efficient and 
effective.  
Desert Storm also seemed to resolve a debate within the U.S. Air Force over the 
proper use of air power.  The U.S. air plan dubbed “Instant Thunder,” created by Colonel 
John Warden’s Checkmate planning staff, became the Desert Storm campaign forming 
the first three phases of General Norman Schwartzkopf’s four-phase plan for Desert 
Storm.128  This plan employed airpower as a strategic weapon able to strike 
simultaneously at all the Iraqi centers of gravity (COGs).  Equally as telling as the plan 
itself, the planning process occurred in a U.S.-only environment, behind locked doors, 
where allies could not access or participate in planning the air war. 
OAF demonstrated the limits of Instant Thunder.  Still riding on the successes of 
airpower in Desert Storm, the USAF attempted to implement a similar strategy in the air-
only war of OAF.  Political constraints placed on targeting and employment during the 
conflict, however, limited the effectiveness of this plan.  Even after the war, OAF air 
commanders lamented the interference of politicians in their air plan rather than 
recognize the limits of U.S. operational culture.129 
 
1. Instant Thunder 
Close examination of the Instant Thunder air plan and its planning process 
highlight the U.S. nature of Instant Thunder.  As a strategic concept, the idea of hitting 
                                                 
127 Cordesman and Wagner, 377; Lambeth, 61-63. 
128 Col Warden led the Air Staff’s Directorate of Warfighting Concepts, also known as Checkmate, 
see Mann, 1.  According to Mann, the concept of phased execution also developed during the planning of 
Desert Storm, see Mann, 61-66.  
129 William Drozdiak paraphrases Maj Gen Short, OAF CJFACC, “As an airman, Short said he would 
have "gone downtown on the first night" and taken the war to Yugoslavia's civilian population by knocking 
out bridges, power plants and telephone networks. But France and other European governments vetoed 
many civilian targets and imposed a limited, phased approach that the military commanders say delayed 
victory.” William Drozdiak, “War Showed U.S.-Allied Inequality,” Washington Post, June 28, 1999: A-01. 
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centers of gravity was not new.130  What was new, however, was the idea of hitting the 
centers of gravity simultaneously.  The very name, Instant Thunder, reflected an opposite 
approach to Vietnam’s incremental application of airpower in Vietnam’s Rolling Thunder 
air operation.131  The conceptual basis of Instant Thunder involved striking multiple, key 
nodes of a system identified as vital to the Iraqi war effort while doing the same to other 
vital systems (parallel attack) at the same time (simultaneity) which would produce a 
cascading failure of the enemy’s military system (strategic paralysis).  The planners of 
Instant Thunder believed that by striking many key strategic targets at the same time, at 
the outset of fighting, would cause the enemy’s war machine to collapse in a matter of 
days.132 
A review of Iraq’s air and ground orders of battle and key elements of its 
infrastructure reveal that the overall goal of Instant Thunder this was not a simple task.133  
Striking just one target requires identification and location of a target, assessment of the 
munitions required to destroy it, enough aircraft carrying enough munitions to ensure its 
destruction, and support aircraft to protect the attacking aircraft during the attack.  
Multiplied by the number of targets Instant Thunder planned to strike at one time, the 
objective behind the operation appears impossible to achieve using pre-Desert Storm 
technologies.   
In order to contemplate an operation like Instant Thunder, planners would have to 
capitalize on “force-multipliers” that were created by new technologies.134  Stealth 
fighters and cruise missiles permitted strikes against heavily defended targets with no 
                                                 
130 The Combined Bombing Offensive in World War II sent U.S. heavy bombers after key aircraft 
industry targets in an effort to establish air superiority.  See Tami Davis Biddle, “British and American 
Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined 
Bomber Offensive,” in John Gooch, ed., 1995, Airpower: Theory and Practice, London: Frank Cass, 1995, 
112-114. 
131 Mann, 2. 
132 Mann states that the Black Hole planners anticipated six to nine days initially.  Mann, 74.   
133 See Mann, 91, for CENTCOM’s list of Iraqi centers of gravity, Mann, 37-39, for key target sets, 
Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, 123-136, for Iraqi orders of battle. 
134 Referring to technologies fielded in the 1980’s, Secretary Perry argues, “At that time NATO 
estimated that if it had to face a surprise armored assault from the Warsaw Pact, it could be outnumbered 
three to one in personnel and armored equipment and so NATO and, in particular, the United States, sought 
to use technology as an equalizer, or “force multiplier.”  William Perry, “Desert Storm and Deterrence in 
the Future,” in Nye and Smith, 241-264. 
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additional protection.  Precision-guided munitions reduced the number of weapons from 
88 per target in Vietnam to one per target in Desert Storm.135 Satellite reconnaissance 
required no aircraft sorties to precisely locate and identify key, fixed targets deep in Iraqi 
territory.  These force-multiplying technologies, all exclusive to the United States in 
Desert Storm, made the Instant Thunder air war plan possible.   
The results of the operation illustrate the impact of these new force multipliers.  
Thirty-eight days of air operations created an environment in which enemy ground troops 
surrendered to heavy bombers flying overhead and allied ground operations required only 
four days to defeat the fourth largest army in the world.136  At the strategic level, Instant 
Thunder reflected the ability of the coalition to employ airpower for strategic and tactical 
objectives simultaneously.  At the operational level, the implementation of the air plan 
reflected an American warfighting paradigm made possible by the resources provided 
and flown by the United States.  The efficiency of precision-guided weapons and the 
surprise provided by stealth fighters and cruise missiles provided the means for parallel 
attack and simultaneity.  U.S. fighters and electronic warfare aircraft protected the mass 
of airpower from Iraq’s robust air defense.137 
 
2. The Black Hole  
Although not as obvious as the U.S. armada of more than 1,300 combat aircraft 
picking apart Iraq’s military capacity, the air planning process provide another example 
American exclusivity in the air portion of the Desert Storm Campaign.  Lt General 
Charles Horner, Desert Storm’s JFACC, established an air-planning cell in Riyadh 
known as the Black Hole both because of its heavily guarded location in a basement 
office and the fact that personnel seemed to enter the planning cell, never to be seen 
                                                 
135 Based on a .9 probability of kill per target.  In WWII, one target required 1500 sorties and 9000 
bombs, in Vietnam 88 sorties and 176 bombs, and Desert Storm using precision-guided munitions 1 sortie 
could actually kill two targets assuming two bombs per aircraft.  The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight 
Plan, 61. 
136 Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume IV, 266; Cordesman and Wagner, 113.  
137 See discussion of counter-IADS resources and packaging in Chapter II. 
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again.138 Here transplants from Colonel Warden’s Checkmate planning staff set up shop 
to plan and eventually run the air war that won Desert Storm.139  
Even as commander of Joint Forces Command, a theoretical equal to U.S. 
Commander in Chief, CENTCOM, General bin Sultan describes the U.S. air-planning 
cell from the perspective of spectator rather than participant.  He matter-of-factly lists the 
reasons for the secrecy of the U.S. planning efforts: the United States insisted on extreme 
secrecy since “this was to be an overwhelmingly American effort” and expressed a desire 
to protect certain technologies.  He lists these technologies as: 
the latest products of its military R&D, such as the F-117 Stealth fighter, 
invisible to radar; precision-guided munitions (PGMs), such as Tomahawk 
Cruise missiles as well as numerous types of laser-guided and TV-guided 
bombs and missiles; night-vision devices, principally infrared detectors; 
and a wide range of electronic systems for communications, surveillance 
and combat, which would jam Saddam’s radars, disrupt his 
communications, and generally suppress his defenses. 140 
There was no doubt in the Joint Forces Commander’s mind who really led the coalition 
and why. 
Through policies of protecting sensitive technologies and the operational plans 
capitalizing on them, U.S. planners excluded other allies from planning roles.  Desert 
Storm war plans were in fact U.S. war plans applied by U.S. commanders relying 
primarily on U.S. technologies.  The Desert Storm coalition implemented a phased 
execution initiated with an overwhelming aerial parallel attack using the concept of 
simultaneity to achieve strategic paralysis.  U.S. doctrinal terms used to describe a U.S. 
operational plan relying on U.S. technology. 
 
3. Operation Allied Force 
The air war in Kosovo provided air power enthusiasts with yet another success 
with which to proclaim the decisiveness of airpower.  Using air power alone, the coalition 
                                                 
138 Bin Sultan, 337 and Mann, 46.  
139 Colonel Warden was director of the Air Staff’s future war plans director from which the initial 
version of the Instant Thunder plan originated.  Mann, 1. 
140 Bin Sultan, 338 
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of NATO forces met its strategic goals in Kosovo.141  Like Desert Storm, however, the 
NATO coalition mostly employed American forces with a little European assistance.  Lt. 
Gen. Michael Short, the CJFACC, stated after the war that the United States conducted 
four fifths of the air strikes I Allied Force.142   
Once again, coalition air power revolved around the mass and efficiency provided 
by U.S. technologies.  The operational culture evident at the start of the air war reflected 
a distinctly American warfighting paradigm.  Two aspects of this U.S. operational culture 
highlight its American origins.  First, medium-altitude operations, employed successfully 
for the first time in Desert Storm, reduced risk to coalition aircraft by eliminating the 
threat of small arms and MANPADS.  Second, targeting plans focusing on Serbia’s 
strategic centers of gravity embodied a simultaneous, parallel attack war plan 
As Lt. Gen Short claimed, the 15,000-foot minimum altitude provided “our best 
opportunity to survive [in conjunction with night attack and precision guided weapons], 
and I continue to believe that.”143  Two underlying aspects of this rule of engagement, 
however, relate to U.S. technologies.  First, medium-altitude operations capitalized on 
PGMs: only PGMs provided the control over collateral damage that the political 
leadership demanded.  Additionally, aircrews often employ PGMs more effectively from 
medium altitude.144  Weather further exacerbated the medium-altitude employment 
challenges but only the United States possessed the satellite-guided Joint Direct Attack 
Munition that was able to self-guide through cloud cover.145  Second, while medium-
altitude operations do protect aircraft from small arms fire and MANPADS, these 
                                                 
141 Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, xvii. 
142 See Chapter II for details on sortie rates and munitions expended in OAF.  Drozdiak cites Lt. Gen 
Short as saying the Unites States was responsible for four fifths of the bombing and missile strikes in the 11 
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143 Quoted in Tirpak, ”Short's View of the Air Campaign…” 
144 For two reasons: safety and effectiveness.  LGB’s require significant “head’s down” time meaning 
the pilot is not looking at the ground but inside his cockpit.  Also, medium altitude employment allows 
more time for the pilot to acquire and guide the weapon after release, over 30 seconds from above 20,000’ 
compared to 6-9 seconds from low altitude.  The author has experience flying F-16s with the U.S. Air 
Force. 
145 While British, French, and Dutch forces possessed some laser-guide weapons capabilities, the U.S. 
provided 80% of the LGBs dropped in the conflict.  Lambeth, 88.  DoD’s report to congress stated that 
operations experienced “a at least 50 percent cloud cover more than 70 percent of the time.” 
Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 86. 
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altitudes increase the threat from SAMs.  U.S. suppression of enemy air defenses and 
electronic warfare assets, however, reduced this threat to a nominal risk.146 While this 
altitude restriction intended to protect coalition aircrew, it appeared to be a viable tactic at 
the outset because of U.S. technology. 
Entering the war, Lt Gen Short’s planners anticipated another demonstration of 
the decisiveness of American-style airpower.  They planned to all but ignore the Serbian 
ground force in Kosovo and concentrate instead on Serbian infrastructure targets in an 
effort to crush Serbia’s will to continue fighting.147  The B-2 stealth bomber, F-117 
stealth fighter and Tomahawk cruise missiles offered the coalition the opportunity to hit 
targets in Belgrade with relatively little risk.  According to John Tirpak:   
Had he been free to structure the air effort as he wanted, Short would have 
arranged for the leaders in Belgrade to wake up “after the first night ... to a 
city that was smoking. No power to the refrigerator and ... no way to get to 
work." He believes that in very short order, Milosevic's staunchest 
supporters would have been demanding that he justify the benefits of 
ethnic cleansing, given the cost.148 
The mass of U.S. heavy bombers, the surprise of U.S. stealth technology, and the 
efficiency of precision-guided weapons offered the coalition the potential to repeat the 
successes of Desert Storm. 
The political realities of the OAF coalition constrained the air war.  Instead of 
giving commanders freedom to conduct the war as they saw fit, officials in Europe and 
Washington did not give commanders free reign to execute their war plan.  Soon into the 
war, a tedious targeting process that required approval from all 19 members of the 
coalition starved the American air machine of targets.149  Concerns about collateral 
damage in Serbia and Kosovo and high-level interest in targeting Serbian ground forces 
in Kosovo did not align with U.S. operational culture or plans.  Lt. Gen. Short observed, 
It was not just apparent at the three-star level that we weren’t following 
the classic air campaign that we'd all learned at Maxwell. It was just as 
apparent [at the captain and major level] that we were not using airpower                                                  
146 See IADS discussion in Chapter II. 
147 Lambeth, xix 
148 Tirpak, “Short's View of the Air Campaign…” 
149 Lambeth, 185. 
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the way we would have wished to use it…airpower [was] not being used 
as well as it could be and the way you have been taught to use it.150 
So while airpower ultimately achieved success in OAF, constraints external to the 
operational process demonstrated the limits, rather than the decisiveness, of U.S. 
airpower and its associate operational culture. 
Whether considered successes or failures, both Desert Storm and OAF bore the 
trappings of U.S. technological prowess.  As the technologically advantaged partner, the 
United States imported its operational culture into the coalition in tandem with its 
airpower contributions.  Both conflicts employed a warfighting scheme built around its 
force-multipliers: stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, satellite reconnaissance, and PGMs.  In 
Desert Storm, parallel attack did in fact achieve strategic paralysis.  Unfortunately, 
without the political will and strategic targets to attack in parallel, airpower in OAF 
regressed to incremental application of airpower reminiscent of Vietnam’s Rolling 
Thunder. 
 
B. COMMAND, CONTROL AND ACCESS 
Command and control relationships and mechanisms serve two functions in 
understanding the operational culture of a coalition.  First, command and control 
functions tend to reflect the political influence in the formation of coalition.  In a 
relatively symmetrical coalition, command relationships tend to be nation centric.  For 
example, in Desert Storm political considerations led to a dual-command structure with 
U.S. and Saudi Arabian generals leading each of the two primary organizations.  Within 
them, the coalition organized other nations according to political sensitivities and 
capabilities: British and French forces fell under the U.S. commander while Arab forces 
fell under the Saudi Commander.  Furthermore, these units tended to “plug into” the 
command chain with direction going directly from the corp-level commander to the 
national commander.   
In both of these operations, however, command relationships deviated from the 
norm due to the technology asymmetry of U.S. forces.  In Desert Storm, the 
overwhelming advantage offered by U.S. air power led to a separate chain of command 
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for airpower that unified all assets under an American commander.  In OAF, the coalition 
deviated from typical NATO command relationships and the American principle of unity 
of command in order to preserve the operation security of its stealth and cruise missile 
assets.  In the Desert Storm case, the technological supremacy of U.S. airpower justified 
the coalition’s adoption of American unity of command doctrine.  In the OAF case, the 
United States used the same airpower superiority to justify a deviation from this doctrine. 
Command and control functions also transmit the warfighting paradigm of the 
lead nation.  In Desert Storm, the United States introduced the ATO as a single source 
document for all air-related tasks and control orders.  Published daily, the ATO published 
all mission tasks, airspace coordination measures, ROE, identification codes and even 
radio frequencies.  The ATO forced all air assets in theater to conform to distinctly 
American forms of employment.151 The dual-ATO system implemented in OAF 
highlighted the friction caused by technology asymmetry within a coalition.    
Information access proved to be another area of friction in both coalitions.  
Information architectures reflected the dominant role played by U.S. assets and 
technologies.  U.S. desire to protect sensitive technologies, intelligence-gathering 
technologies in particular, created a bureaucratic firewall that prevented the broad sharing 
of information around the coalition.  Simply put, U.S. forces would not allow allied 
forces access to many classified computer and communication systems.  As a result, 
coalition personnel developed cumbersome work-arounds to move releasable information 
from sensitive U.S. systems into allied-accessible formats.  In many cases, the U.S. forces 
did not allow allies access to certain information, which allowed U.S. forces to dominate 
most operational functions. 
The fragile advantages offered by force-multiplying technologies drives a desire 
within a military to protect its technological advantage, even from its allies.  Security 
protocols designed to protect these technologies also serve to exclude the technology 
disadvantaged.  Exclusion reinforces the leadership role of the technologically 
advantaged force and stymies broader participation in operational planning and  
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execution.  In both operations, much of the intelligence and communication functions 
existed on U.S.-only systems leaving only the United States to create and implement 
coalition operations.   
 
1.  Technology and Command 
Command relationships in Desert Storm and OAF were derived from very 
different sources.  The former developed out of political sensitivities and recognition of 
the overwhelming contribution of the United States.  The coalition established a dual, 
parallel structure to accommodate the political sensitivities of the host country and 
facilitate the operations of the greater force contributor.152  OAF command relationships 
derived from established NATO relationships with American generals occupying the key 
leadership positions.  Despite well-established NATO relationships, two separate 
planning and approval processes developed to accommodate technologies that U.S. 
officials believed were sensitive.   
The command structure in Desert Storm was not unexpected or unique.  As would 
be expected in a diverse, multilateral coalition, command relationships ran along national 
lines with international crossovers happening only at the highest levels.  Political realities 
provided the basis for the general command scheme:  two parallel commands, one led by 
the United States because of its dominant contribution to the coalition and the other led 
by Saudi Arabia to mitigate potential Arab sensitivities.  National forces “plugged in” to 
the force commanders (CENTCOM and Joint Forces Command) at their highest 
command level and operational direction flowed top down through this chain of 
command with one exception, the air war. 153 
The DoD organized U.S. forces in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.154  Accordingly, all U.S. forces in 
theater reported to a single, unified commander, the Commander in Chief, Central 
Command (CINCCENT).  In accordance with joint doctrine, forces were organized into                                                  
152 Bin Sultan, 193. 
153 For diagrams and explanations of Desert Storm organizational structures, see Joel H. Nadel, 1993, 
“Command and Control,” in Bruce W. Watson, Bruce George, Peter Tsouras, B.L. Cyr, 1993, Military 
Lessons of the Gulf War, London: Greenhill Books. 
154 Hallion, 259-260. 
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functional components: land, maritime, air, and special operations with a commander for 
each reporting directly to CINCCENT.  While this command organization applied to U.S. 
forces, those forces falling under Joint Forces Command remained outside the U.S. chain 
of command and those forces that remained in CINCCENT’s organization did not 
necessarily fall under the respective component command.155 
The JFACC commands all U.S. air assets in theater.156  The JFACC then 
conducts centralized allocating, planning and tasking functions thereby ensuring the 
efficient use of airpower for the overall campaign.  This meant that a single commander, 
for the first time in U.S. history, controlled all air power in theater directly.  If an aircraft 
was not on the JFACC’s ATO it did not fly.157  The U.S. unified command concept 
entailed complete centralized control for the entire air effort. 
American air power in Desert Storm provided the coalition with air superiority.  
Recognition of the asymmetry in air capability within the coalition led all of the coalition 
participants to cede their air assets to the control of the JFACC.  In Desert Storm, the 
JFACC allocated all coalition air power, matched targets to aircraft, formed mission 
packages, tasked refueling and surveillance, and directed every air mission.158   
Operation Allied Force also established a parallel command but, in this case, U.S. 
officers headed both chains of command.  The United States chose to place stealth 
aircraft, cruise missiles and their related assets under U.S. European Command 
(EUCOM) rather than chop them to NATO’s air component and Lt. Gen. Short.  
EUCOM maintained allocation, planning and targeting responsibilities for these assets 
separate from the NATO chain of command (see Figure 1). Despite the fact that  
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American generals led the NATO coalition as well, U.S. stealth and cruise missile assets 
plan and flew in U.S.-only operational structures, denying access or even awareness to 
NATO allies.159  
This is not to say that the CJFACC was not privy to these missions.  After the 
war, Lt. Gen. Short confessed that maintaining separate ATO systems, mission planning 
cells, and execution processes complicated the war effort.160  The DoD’s report to 
Congress echoed Lt. Gen. Shorts concerns about leaving allied forces out of portions of 
the air campaign, “NATO’s command structure worked well, but parallel U.S. and 
NATO command-and-control structures complicated operational planning and unity of 
command.”161  Separate planning and execution elements in the same air war within such 
limited airspace created a series of issues from political friction to increased risk of 
fratricide. 
Concern about the operational security of stealth and cruise missiles presented the 
United States with a choice: do not include these assets in the operation or create a 
separate operational structure to accommodate them.  In choosing the later, the United 
States demonstrated commitment to its own strategic and operational paradigm at the 
expense of self-proclaimed, key tenets of military operations: centralized control and 
unity of command.162  The coalition’s tacit acceptance of this separate, U.S.-only 
operational structure reflects its complete dependence on U.S. assets.163  Coalition 
dependence on American technology and leadership opened space for the United States 
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to imprint its operational culture on the coalition.  The resulting command structures 
served to transmit the American way of fighting wars throughout the operation. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Operation Allied Force Organizational Strucutre 
Source: Sheetz, Patrick, “Air War over Serbia,” in Larry Wentz, ed., 2002, Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR 
Experience, Washington D.C.: Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, 104. 
 
2. The Air Tasking Order 
The ATO provides a key indication of the implementation of U.S. operational 
culture.  Used for the first time in Desert Storm, the ATO reflected the centralized 
command of the JFACC.  Through the ATO, the JFACC matched targets to specific 
sorties bypassing many layers in the chain of command.  The ATO was a uniquely 
American function derived from a uniquely American organizational structure.  The fact 
that the coalition willingly accepted the unified air commander concept in Desert Storm 
and the ATO as the single-source tasking document for air power reveals the extent to 
which U.S. operational culture shaped coalition operations.   
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The dual-ATO structure in OAF provides even greater evidence of the 
relationship between technology advantage and operational culture.  In the interest of 
preserving the operational security of its stealth and cruise missile assets, the United 
States felt obligated to establish a separate planning and execution function outside of the 
NATO coalition.  Violating its own doctrine touting the value of unified command, these 
assets remained outside of the coalition chain of command (see figure 1).  This meant that 
U.S. desires to preserve the technological advantage provided by stealth and cruise 
missiles compromised the centralizing functions the ATO.164   
The United States in OAF established an air war in accordance with its doctrine 
using its unified command structure and mechanisms for centralized control.  It then 
created a new U.S. warfighting structure in the interest of preserving the technology 
asymmetry of stealth and cruise missiles.  The operational culture of the coalition and the 
exceptions to this operational culture were both distinctly American in origin.  
Command relationships and their control mechanisms provide evidence of the 
direct relationship between technological asymmetry and operational culture.  The Desert 
Storm command relationships demonstrate this influence most clearly.  The ground and 
air wars possessed very different forms and degrees of technological asymmetry.  The 
ground war did see some U.S. advantages in the form of faster combat vehicles, long-
range weapons, and detection technologies but much of this difference was on the 
margins.  Using Steven Metz’s taxonomy, these differences represented less asymmetry 
as merely improvements in capability.  Air power, on the other hand, reflected a 
tremendous asymmetry between the United States and its allies.  Stealth, satellite 
reconnaissance, electronic warfare, heavy bombers, and precision weapons produced 
significant asymmetries within all three of Metz’s asymmetry categories. 
The U.S. technological advantage in air power enticed the allies to cede their air 
power to U.S. control and accept its operational method.  The U.S. JFACC relied on his 
plan and implemented it through U.S. mechanism, the ATO.  Through these structures, 
the air war displayed a distinctly American form: parallel attack executed simultaneously 
in pursuit of strategic paralysis.  
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C. INFORMATION ACCESS 
The implications of the RMA, continue to be contested in the literature.165  One 
implication not thoroughly explored by scholars, however, is the risk that new 
information technologies might lead to the exclusion of allies from command and combat 
function for technical security reasons. 
Information is intangible, fleeting, and perishable.  The means for gathering 
information are vulnerable to low cost countermeasures and once information gets into 
enemy hands or the public sphere, it cannot be recovered.  Information technologies, 
therefore, require high degrees of protection to ensure the security of the means of 
collection and content.  Simply revealing a piece of intelligence can reveal the manner in 
which it was collected and then risk the viability of that method in the future.  The 
implications of sharing these technologies and the information they produce include 
many ramifications that extend well beyond the immediacy of the operation at hand. 
In Desert Storm and OAF, the United States provided the bulk of the information 
technologies in the form of ISR and communications systems.  The fragile nature of these 
technologies led to strict access protocols that often allowed access to only one member 
of the coalition, the United States.166  Patrick Duecy noted in his assessment of NATO 
Headquarters during OAF that intra-coalition secrecy had a negative impact on 
operations: 
Perversely, the most significant impediment to effective crisis information 
reporting and dissemination operations during Kosovo was posed by the 
nation contributing the most intelligence to the Alliance, the United States. 
U.S. intelligence producers persisted in using U.S.-only intelligence 
information systems to disseminate intelligence released to NATO.167 
Information collection, processing and dissemination remained stuck behind U.S. security 
restrictions.  Even when U.S. officials determined the information itself may be released 
to allied forces, the exclusive nature of the intelligence systems required slow,                                                  
165 Owens, for example, argues that the information RMA offers the means for the United States 
military to remain the dominant world force well into the future.  Owens, op cit.  For a relevant debate 
about information technologies and RMA, see Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter, eds., 1995, 
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166 Patrick Duecy, “The forgotten Echelon: NATO Headquarters Intelligence During the Kosovo 
Crisis,” in Wentz, 150. 
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cumbersome transcription processes to pull the information off of these systems, often by 
hand, and retransmit it via systems accessible by the allies.168 
The use of U.S.-exclusive information systems reflected and transmitted U.S. 
operational culture. In his account of OAF targeting cell procedures, Deputy Judge 
Advocate General Tony Montgomery’s description of the target approval process 
provides another indication of the U.S.-nature of the operational process.  He described a 
complex collaborative process of target identification and approval run using off-the-
shelf Microsoft software but located on secure, U.S.-systems.169 
 Most indicative of the U.S. operational culture are Montgomery’s complaints 
about the cumbersome nature of the serial target processing early in the operation.  He 
describes several initiatives, including the online collaborative process, aimed at 
expediting the target approval process to ensure sufficient targets were available for the 
intended pace of operations.170  The motivation to shrink the targeting process from a 
one-week cycle to one day reflects U.S. operational culture for speed and simultaneity.171  
The online-collaboration taking place on a U.S.-only classified system perpetuated U.S. 
operational culture by excluding allies from participation in the process. 
Information technologies introduce even greater interoperability concerns than 
traditional weapons systems.  Access, data formats, speed and capability all present 
frictions that could inhibit if not totally prevent cooperation among allies.  Without broad 
participation, the lead participant develops the form of the operation.  In Desert Storm, 
the United States mitigated interoperability problems by assuming responsibility for 
command, control and ISR functions.172  In OAF, targeting process and information  
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sharing systems created access barriers that excluded allies from participation.  In both 
cases, the United States created an operational environment to suit its doctrine and 
strategy. 
 
D. CONCLUSION  
Technological asymmetry opens space for the advantaged partner to imprint its 
operational culture onto a coalition.  This occurs through both passive and active 
interaction between technologies and coalition structures.  Technological advantage 
passively transmits its operational culture through the deference of other coalition 
partners to the advantaged partner.  Additionally, coalition reliance on risk mitigation 
technologies and dependence on force multiplying assets leads members to relinquish 
leadership responsibilities to the advantaged partner.  Desert Storm provides the textbook 
case: the coalition allies willingly ceded all their air assets to the command and control of 
the U.S. JFACC in recognition of its superior air capabilities.  
Technology advantage actively impresses its associated operational culture 
through exclusion functions.  Reliance on stealth and cruise missile assets in OAF led to 
coalition acceptance of dual planning and execution functions, one of which remained 
exclusive to U.S. visibility.  Similarly, American information systems built with strict 
security and access protocols denied allies access to precious intelligence and 
coordination functions.  Once again, reliance on the United States for these functions 
allowed American doctrine to define the operational environment of the coalition.  The 
allies essentially were left out of loop. 
The net effect of passive and active favoritism toward the technologically 
advantaged partner is the adoption of this partner’s operational culture at the expense of 
other inputs.  From another perspective the more reliant a coalition becomes on a nation-
exclusive technology, the less influence it has on the related applications and the more 
unilateral the operational culture becomes.  In Desert Storm, the overwhelming 
technological advantage of American air power from aircraft to weapons to intelligence 
translated into a distinctly American air war.  The JFACC’s air machine absorbed the air 
assets of other nations into the Instant Thunder paradigm. 
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Taking a holistic look at the interdependence among U.S. technology, leadership, 
and operational culture, a pattern of reinforcing relationships appears that culminates in 
an apparent unilateral nature of coalition operations.  U.S. military technologies continue 
to progress in the direction of greater speed, greater interdependence, and broader 
situation awareness.  Only the United States today possesses the resources to acquire this 
level of development.  Doctrine associated with this technological push builds on the 
Instant Thunder premise of overwhelming mass applied instantaneously across parallel 
strategic systems.  Only the United States possesses the overwhelming mass, multiplied 
by its technologies, to implement this strategy viably.  The resulting operational culture 
requires command structures and mechanisms tailored to these high-speed but centralized 
strategic concepts.  Only the United States has built and trained to these command 
structures and only the Unites States has the experience to employ them effectively. 
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IV. THE MITIGATING EFFECTS OF TIME 
Integrating military forces into a coherent coalition is a process of combining 
many discrete systems to develop a single, coherent system of systems.  Each 
participating force provides a discrete military capability that must interface with the 
military systems of other participants.  In general, as the density of relationships within a 
system increases, altering the system becomes more complex.173  Applied to a system of 
military systems, more participants in a coalition increase its complexity.  Controlling 
complexity is a function of time: time to assess ramifications of change, time to scope 
integration tasks, and time to develop and implement interoperability fixes and work-
arounds.   
In a war, time is a limited commodity.  Eventually, time runs out and a coalition 
must begin combat operations accepting interoperability within its military system as it 
stands.  Given a deadline with coalition objectives at risk, commanders must weigh the 
potential instability created by attempting to merge various military systems versus the 
benefits of employing a coherent system of systems.174  If the risks of instability are too 
great, commanders are obligated to discontinue attempts to merge participating forces 
opting instead to maintain a coalition of independent systems.   
A coalition of independent military systems, however, still presents commanders 
with a “use or lose” choice:  use participating military systems as independent but 
isolated entities or pick the most effective of the systems and discontinue use of the 
others.  Factors such as efficiency, effectiveness, cost, political gain and operational risk 
contribute to this assessment.  Time either provides opportunity to troubleshoot 
interoperability or forces a decision as time for action nears.   
In terms of technological asymmetries within a coalition, lack of time exacerbates 
the tendency of a coalition to coalesce around the technology-advantaged partner’s 
operational culture.  Any amount of time less than that required to implement an                                                  
173 James Wirtz argues that dense systems can “defeat purposeful behavior” and “make a system 
resistant to change,” James J. Wirtz and Jeffery A. Larsen, eds., 2001, Rocket’s Red Glare: Missile 
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interoperability fix results in even greater reliance on the technologically advantaged 
partner to either provide a work-around or assume an increased burden.  Lack of 
sufficient time to implement a fix diverts burden to the technological leader by either 
allowing just enough time to insert its technological capabilities as interoperability work-
arounds or forcing the coalition into relying on the technology leader’s capabilities at the 
expense of greater participation. 
Time acts as an intervening variable on the effects of technological asymmetries 
on coalition structures.  As more time is available, interoperability issues are more likely 
to be solved allowing greater allied participation.  As time available decreases, fixes 
become less possible forcing coalitions to implement work-arounds to mitigate 
interoperability problems.  An absence of time to prepare forces a coalition to depend 
heavily on the advantaged partner to assume greater combat burden and leadership 
responsibilities.  
This chapter examines the intervening effect of time on technology asymmetries 
by examining two aspects of Desert Storm and Allied Force.  The first section compares 
operational structures in Desert Storm, with over five months of preparation time, to 
OAF, with close to no preparation time.  In Desert Storm, preparation time allowed for 
extensive training regimens, including full-scale rehearsals allowing coalition forces to 
become accustomed to the U.S. battle pace and extensive use of airpower.  OAF, on the 
other hand, did not reach its peak operational strength until 34 days into the 72-day war 
forcing a heavy reliance on U.S. airpower and its operational system.175 
The second section focuses on communications structures.  While time allowed 
the Desert Storm coalition to create work-arounds for many communications 
interoperability deficiencies, these work-arounds often entailed dependence on American 
technologies.  In OAF, a lack of time did not allow the coalition the opportunity to 
integrate the various national systems, including those of NATO members, into the more 
robust U.S. systems.  This exacerbated exclusion issues for the allies and increased 
American dominance within the coalition. 
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The last section briefly looks at a twist in the technology asymmetry-time 
relationship.  Desert Storm introduced American high-speed maneuver doctrine, the 
AirLand Battle.  The United States attempted to implement this doctrine into OAF with 
even greater improvements in the areas of intelligence, communications and 
collaboration.  Computer-based planning and approval processes provided by the United 
States presented such a dense operational system that they effectively prevent allied 
systems from integrating into it.  This did not prevent the allies, however, from wielding 
political influence on coalition operations.  Political influence in the form of a tedious 
and slow target approval process slowed the U.S. high-speed operational culture by 
starving it for targets to attack.  The operational culture of the coalition remained 
disconnected from its political leadership as the military continued to implement a war 
plan incompatible with the incremental application of force prescribed by the allied 
partners.    
Without time to create fixes to asymmetries, a coalition will increase its reliance 
on technologies provided by the technologically-advantage partner.  Without time to 
implement work-arounds, the coalition will rely completely on the technologically 
advantaged partner or suffer without some capabilities altogether. 
 
A. PREPARATION AND TRAINING 
The nature of military technologies today does not allow for rapid development of 
high-technology fixes for technology deficiencies.  Long gone are the days when a 
military could identify the need for a new airplane and have a full production line running 
in a matter of months.176 To develop interoperability, countries establish military 
relationships to develop fixes through long-term programs such as training exercises, 
personnel exchanges, and technology transfers.  Militaries do not always have the luxury 
of choosing coalition partners, however, and often find themselves having to fight 
alongside other militaries with whom they are unfamiliar.  Without years available to 
address technological asymmetries among national militaries, the likelihood of 
implementing fixes for interoperability deficiencies is small. 
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As a military alliance, NATO provides its members a forum for establishing 
interoperability. NATO members participating in Desert Storm enjoyed over four 
decades of doctrine sharing, cooperative training, and common hardware development.  
Similarly, decades of close ties with the Saudi Arabian government led to U.S. Foreign 
Military Sales programs that provided a degree of U.S. compatibility with Saudi military 
infrastructure.  According to the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to 
Congress, these programs paid large dividends: 
Since the 1950s, US foreign policy has included a long-term commitment 
to security assistance, which helped develop strong relationships with 
NATO and Coalition partners.  Security assistance and defense sales 
provide compatibility of equipment; the training that comes with US 
hardware often leads recipients to adopt US doctrine and tactics, resulting 
in operational compatibility as well. The US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
system provided Saudi military infrastructure, US-origin equipment and 
training for most of the partners, and the foundation of peacetime 
cooperation and interoperability on which the Coalition was built.177 
Even interoperability successes identified in the report to Congress, however, 
relied heavily on U.S. technology.  Additionally, FMS and security assistance led to the 
adoption of U.S. doctrines and tactics. 
Despite the efforts of decades past, NATO forces participating in Desert Storm 
did not enjoy complete interoperability and Saudi Arabian forces still lacked key 
equipment required for proper communications with U.S. forces, let alone other NATO 
members.178  The addition of over a dozen more militaries who had never worked 
together increased interoperability complexity considerably.179 The U.S. Air Force 
provided the coalition with a well-equipped air armada trained in close-support 
operations and combined operations.  This force possessed communications, weapons 
systems, surveillance and reconnaissance, and battle management capabilities able to  
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work closely with fast-moving ground forces.180  Not only were other air forces not as 
capable or proficient, but many of the ground forces had never even worked with close 
air support.181   
Since time did not permit other militaries to reach similar levels of air capability, 
coalition planners designed and executed many exercises immediately preceding Desert 
Storm to provide the other militaries to close air support (CAS).182  The coalition 
conducted seven separate air exercises and held five different weekly exercises all 
designed to familiarize participating air forces with control systems, identify and correct 
coordination and safety procedures, and rehearse combat operations. Coalition air assets 
participated in 123 exercise events covering air interdiction, defensive counter air, close 
air support and special operations.183 
The complexity of close air support operations also led U.S. commanders to 
deploy to liaison teams to Joint Forces Command East and West (JFC-E and JFC-W) to 
manage coordination with American CAS assets.  The United States attached tactical 
control parties to allied forces at the battalion level and above to facilitate cooperation 
and assist with CAS procedures.  The Saudi Arabian military used the training and 
exercise opportunities to form six of its own tactical control teams prior to combat 
operations.184   
In addition, the United States deployed ground liaison teams and Special Forces 
units to train coalition soldiers in a wide range of tactical applications.  U.S. 
communications gear, NBC defensive equipment, and CAS all created technological 
asymmetries that may have prevented the coalitions from accessing these capabilities at 
all.  Training in the days that lead up to the war mitigated this interoperability deficiency.  
As Conduct of the Persian Gulf War explains,  
                                                 
180 Cordesman and Wagner, 528. 
181 General Khaled bin Sultan explains, “The problem was that my Saudi forces, and most of the other 
forces under my command, had not had any experience of close air support." Bin Sultan, 198. 
182 The Gulf War Air Power Survey states one of the objectives of in-theater training to be, 
“Demonstrate to allied land forces that fighters could be brought over their positions safely.”  Gulf War Air 
Power Survey, Volume V, 165. 
183 Ibid., 167-204. 
184 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 582; Cordesman and Wagner, 517 and 561; and bin Sultan, 234-
235. 
66 
Since the Coalition troops would have to rely on a largely American air 
force, communications and CAS received especially heavy emphasis, but 
the Green Berets also stressed weapons training and instruction in basic 
small unit tactics, chemical countermeasures, and land navigation.185 
Training not only provided non-U.S. forces the opportunity to employ these 
capabilities, it transferred American doctrine and tactics to these militaries.  Five and a 
half months of training oriented toward mitigating interoperability deficiencies equated to 
five and a half months of coalition forces learning the U.S. way of warfighting. 
In sum, the five and half months leading up to Desert Storm afforded coalition 
forces time to mitigate compatibility issues through a program of technology transfer, 
training, and personnel exchange.  Each of these programs increased the burden on the 
United States, which had to provide the training and liaison personnel and equipment.  
The work-arounds implemented by U.S. forces also created a one-way conduit for the 
transmission of tactics, doctrine, and standard operating procedures to coalition partners. 
 
B. COMMUNICATIONS 
Communications structures in Desert Storm and OAF offer comparative cases 
highlighting the effect of time on technological asymmetries.  Incompatibilities in 
communications capabilities stand out among other forms of asymmetry.  Without the 
means to share information, coordinate, or collaborate, a coalition partner risks exclusion 
from operations.  In cases where time was available to develop work-arounds, exclusion 
was limited or prevented.  However, without time to develop work-arounds, commanders 
had to choose between excluding allies and losing capability. 
 
1. Desert Storm: Time for Work-arounds 
The diverse membership of the Desert Storm coalition created a myriad of 
communications problems.  Even members of NATO, whose close military relationships 
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Allied capability gaps forced the United States to provide satellite communications gear 
to coalition members and assist with equipment modifications to establish 
communications interoperability.186   
Saudi Arabian forces also required a significant quantity of U.S. communication 
equipment to improve the robustness of their command and control apparatus.  Secure 
communications, specifically, required an infusion of U.S. technologies to allow the Joint 
Forces Command (JFC) to maintain a high level of operation security.187  For example, 
the Saudi Arabian military did not have the means to communicate securely with 
CENTCOM and other NATO forces.  The U.S. National Security Agency modified a 
number of commercial variants of the U.S. STU-III secure telephone systems to give the 
Saudis this capability.  This was a work-around, however, rather than fix in that this 
modified STU-III was not compatible with either U.S. or NATO systems thus requiring 
that these forces maintain multiple secure phone systems during the conflict.188 
The sheer volume of communications suggests the gravity of the scenario and the 
intervening effect of time to mitigate problems.  Just after U.S. forces arrived in Saudi 
Arabia, telephone call completion rates back to the United States hovered between 20 and 
30 percent.  It took a team of Bell Laboratories and AT&T specialists three months to 
identify the problem and apply a work-around.189  As Lt. Gen. James Cassity, Director of 
Command, Control and Computers for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, bragged, “The [United 
States’] services put more electronic communications connectivity into the Gulf in 90 
days than we put into Europe in 40 years."190  U.S. forces inserted U.S. technology to 
improve the inadequate communications infrastructure in theater.  Without months 
available prior to combat, much of the communications capacity that enabled the high-
speed operations of the AirLand Battle would not have been available. 
 
 
                                                 
186 Zanini and Morrison Taw, 53 and 55; Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 582. 
187 Zanini, 53.   
188 Gulf War Air Power Survey, Summary, 215. 
189 Sterling D. Sessions and Carl R. Jones, 1993, Interoperability: A Desert Storm Case Study. 
McNair Paper Eighteen. Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 5. 
190 Sessions, 1. 
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2. Allied Force: Use or Exclude? 
OAF offers examples of technological asymmetries causing commanders to either 
exclude allies to preserve capability or discard capability to include allies. Without the 
time to implement work-arounds, interoperability in these cases was not possible.  
Commanders had to decide whether to rely exclusively on one partner for a capability or 
go without the capability altogether.    
Despite forty years of close working relationships, NATO aircraft did not possess 
interoperable, secure communication equipment.  Many air forces arrived in theater with 
their own type of secure radio; some arrived with no secure communications capability at 
all.  Unlike Desert Storm, there was no time to establish common protocols or transfer 
hardware to establish secure communications capability among all the participants. This 
forced coalition commanders to choose between relying solely on coalition aircraft with 
compatible hardware and using only non-secure communications to ensure proper control 
and coordination.  The commanders chose the later and thereby compromised operations 
security for greater coalition participation.191 
In another example from OAF, systems used to transmit and process sensitive 
intelligence information prevented access by allied partners.  As reported in the 
Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After Action Report, the coalition never established a 
single, integrated network to share sensitive information.192  At best, information passed 
from U.S. systems to allies using liaison personnel who would pull information off a 
classified system, transcribe it into a form releasable to allies, and hand it to an allied 
representative.  More typically, allies did not receive information at all.  Since the United 
States provided the bulk of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
infrastructure, the preponderance of intelligence data existed within the U.S. intelligence 
system “stovepipe.”193  The reports adds, “In addition to dissemination problems on the 
                                                 
191 John Peters claims, “After the war, several U.S. and NATO commanders acknowledged that the 
Yugoslav forces often had advance knowledge of NATO targets, and indicated that the lack of secure 
communications played an important role in this security breach,” John E. Peters, et al., European 
Contributions to Operation Allied Force, 57.  See also Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action 
Report:, 74. 
192 Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 49. 
193 “Stovepipe” refers to systems or forces not integrated horizontally within a greater organization. 
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data networks discussed above, U.S. sensitivity to releasing certain types of information 
greatly inhibited combined planning and operations in some areas.”194 
Between Desert Storm and OAF, time both provided and denied opportunity to 
mitigate interoperability issues.  At one extreme, four decades allowed NATO forces to 
develop some common doctrine and develop some technical interoperability.  At the 
other, time forced commanders to choose between including and excluding allied 
participation.   
In Desert Storm, a small amount of time allowed coalition forces to adopt U.S. 
hardware for communication interoperability.  Time to train and exercise allowed allies 
in Desert Storm to learn and incorporate U.S. tactics. The absence of time to address 
asymmetries forced “use or exclude” decisions that ultimately decreased the degree of 
allied participation. 
 
C. TIME, POLITICS AND OPERATIONAL CULTURE 
Time intervenes in the relationship between operational and political levels of a 
coalition as well.  When sufficient time does not exist for coalition militaries to address 
cooperation and compatibility issues, the coalition gives deference to the more 
technologically advanced force.  The operational culture of the coalition reflects that of 
the more capable partner.  This relationship does not extend, however, to the political 
level of the coalition.  When time limitations force deference to a technologically 
advanced force, time is similarly unavailable for the coalition’s operational structures to 
digest political agreements and varied national policies.  Coalitions relying heavily on 
one military risk a mismatch between political and diplomatic considerations and 
operational culture. 
 In OAF, U.S. operational culture derived from the high-speed maneuver doctrine 
that proved successful in Desert Storm.  The Instant Thunder air plan created a ripple 
effect on U.S. joint doctrine.  Buzz words such as effects-based targeting, parallel attack, 
simultaneity, and strategic attack concentrated strategy on speed.  Through rapid, parallel 
strikes at key nodes within the enemy’s military system, the attacker would not allow the 
enemy time to recover, reorient, or rebuild.  This strategy advocated decreasing the time 
                                                 
194 Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 49-50. 
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friendly forces require to see, assess, and act while increasing the time the enemy requires 
to do the same.  Success is achieved though agility and speed.195 
 The lack of time to plan and prepare for OAF left the coalition heavily reliant on 
U.S. assets and operational culture.  American strategic thought following Desert Storm 
resulted in a force and doctrine formed around the strategic philosophy evolved from 
Instant Thunder.  Resultant operational structures and resources supported this strategy: 
air tasking orders; precision-guided weapons; command and control functions using 
computer-collaboration and video teleconferencing; high-technology ISR assets; and 
night operations technologies to name just a few.196 
 The U.S. commanders in charge of the OAF coalition envisioned a plan 
resembling Instant Thunder.  Through an overwhelming application of airpower, the 
coalition would force Serbia to capitulate in just a matter of days.197  The plan, however, 
stumbled on reality as the war extended longer than the anticipated few days.  Adding 
targets to attack lists involved a tedious process involving unanimous approvals from all 
participating members.  Not only did the approval process slow the pace of operations, 
but every member nation exhibited its own interpretations of appropriate targeting in 
pursuit of coalition objectives.198 
 In the rush to establish coalition operational structures, the members of the 
coalition did not have the opportunity to establish consensus on strategy or operational 
mechanisms before the start of operations.  U.S. commanders bristled as the member 
nations expressed their standpoints through the target approval process.199  When target 
approval process limited the military’s ability to execute its style of war, operational 
effectiveness suffered.  It took the coalition in Desert Storm 38 days of air attacks and 4 
                                                 
195 An indication of this strategic mindset from this quote regarding the combined air operations 
center concept found in the Kosovo After-Action, “This faster deployment will help shrink the strategic 
decision loop while the greater cohesion and training of an expeditionary CAOC will enable it to tighten 
the operational decision loop,”  Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 46.  
196 Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 25 and 28. 
197 Lambeth, xix. 
198 For example, Netherlands vetoed the Serbian presidential palace as a target because a Rembrandt 
painting hung on the first floor of the building.  For ramifications of varied national concerns and the 
approval process, see Peters, et al., European Contributions to Operation Allied Force, 26-29.   
199 John Tirpak, “Short's View of the Air Campaign…”  
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days on the ground to defeat the forth-largest army in the world.  It took the coalition in 
Allied Force 72 days to meet its limited objectives. Without the time for coalition 
members to express their national concerns and deliberate on a unified approach to 
operations, the coalition endures operation friction as issues are worked out in the midst 
of combat.   
The operational culture in OAF did not align with the political objectives.  Since 
the coalition still required target approvals and guidance from a unanimous committee of 
19 members, the coalition military adopted an operational culture ill-suited to its own 
political leadership.200  The political level of the coalition in OAF was multi-lateral; the 
operational level was not.  In OAF, the exclusionary effects resulting from dependence 
on U.S. technologies and operational culture limited the communications channels from 
national leaders to coalition military leaders.  U.S. operational dominance meant the 
coalition could not easily adapt to the varied national concerns of its members. 
Comparing the OAF disconnect between the political leadership and operational 
culture to that of Desert Storm, the mitigating effects of time stand out.  Over the months 
leading up to the war in Iraq, commanders worked through a myriad of organizational 
and operational issues that fine-tuned the operational structures.  Operational issues such 
as placing French Troops with American forces in the west and the shifting British forces 
to attack with the Army’s VII Corp addressed technological issues while simultaneously 
appeasing national leadership.201  Even seemingly small issues, such as the Saudi 
Arabian commander assuming the title of “Joint Forces Commander,” served to mollify 
political tension.202  
Time available in Desert Storm to fine tune operational structures allowed some 
discourse between the national leadership of participants and the coalition military 
                                                 
200 Peters, et al., European Contributions to Operation Allied Force, 72. 
201 The decision to move the French was based on their light armor, limited night capabilities, and 
limited air support.  This placement also allowed French forces to cooperate with U.S. troops while still 
remaining independence of command, Cordesman and Wagner, 170.  The shift of British troops from U.S. 
Marine’s 1st Marine Expeditionary Force to VII Corps was in response to British concerns that their 1st 
Armor Division was not suited for the frontal assault planned for 1 MEF, Cordesman and Wagner, 160.  
Both of these cases exemplify changes in operational structure possible only because of time available to 
negotiate for and implement the change. 
202 Bin Sultan, 29-33. 
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command.  National concerns had time to be expressed and absorbed into the coalition.  
A lack of time to build and tune coalition structures in OAF forced its operational culture 
to reflect that of the United States without fine-tuning to address multi-national concerns.  
As a result, the coalition experienced friction between the incremental and political target 
approval process and the U.S.-imposed operational culture.    
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Technology asymmetry contributes to, and is often causal to, operational 
structures built within a coalition. The military with a technological advantage will 
assume a greater burden, risk, and responsibility for the coalition as a whole.  As 
coalition members cede more responsibility, the coalition more closely reflects the 
operational culture of the advantaged partner. 
Time intervenes in this relationship inversely.  With time in abundance, allies use 
a variety of programs to establish relationships between their militaries.  Through long- 
term exposure to one another, militaries troubleshoot compatibility issues until fixes 
establish interoperability.  Interoperability is not, however, absolute.  The Desert Storm 
and OAF cases indicate that interoperability exists per capability.  Two forces may 
possess interoperable non-secure communications, for example, but incompatible secure 
communications. Therefore, any coalition presents potential interoperability issues as it 
approaches combat operations.  
Since a coalition is temporary by definition, time to implement fixes is most likely 
not available.  Coalition partners must then use time available to implement work-
arounds for compatibility issues.  More participants add greater complexity to the 
interoperability puzzle.  Desert Storm offered examples of the many strategies to mitigate 
interoperability deficiencies including training, technology transfers, and personnel 
exchanges.  Each of these strategies, however, added additional burden and contributed to 
even greater reliance on the technology-advantaged partner, the United States. 
This influence of time on technology asymmetry-generated interoperability 
problems is most acute when time does not exist to implement work-arounds.  Without 
the time to troubleshoot operational structures and rehearse military relationships, the 
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coalition cedes operational responsibilities to the partner offering the technologies that 
reduce risk to friendly troops and innocents and offer the greatest potential for success.  
In OAF, the United States assumed the bulk of the operational responsibilities causing the 
coalition as a whole to adopt its warfighting paradigm emphasizing speed and 
overwhelming force. 
Time intervenes further in the effects of technological asymmetry by allowing 
interaction between a coalition’s operational level and its political level.  With time 
available, coalitions implement work-around strategies, which allow allies greater 
participation.  Greater allied participation at the operational level provides a conduit for 
discourse between participating nations and the coalition’s military leadership.  With time 
in short supply, coalition participants cede responsibility to the dominant partner at the 
expense of their own participation.  As a result, communications between the political 
and operational levels of a coalition are more limited.  National leaders wield less 
influence on operations as military readiness outpaces political deliberations.  OAF 
demonstrated one possible repercussion:  coalition military leadership misinterprets 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. TECHNOLOGY AND COALITION STRUCTURES 
U.S. technological dominance in Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force 
contributed to the U.S. role as primary force provider and coalition leader.  Participating 
members of both coalitions ceded influence in return for the advantages provided by U.S. 
technologies: reduction in friendly losses, decreased risk of collateral damage, increased 
intelligence and greater effectiveness.  Chapters II and III trace the process in Desert 
Storm and OAF that contributed to the United States taking responsibility for most 
operations.   Technological advantages offered by U.S. capabilities reduced the aggregate 
risk of friendly losses and collateral damage while improving the effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations.  Coalition preference for these advantages contributed to 
increased operational primacy for the United States, which allowed it to impose its 
operational culture on the coalition as a whole.     
This process suggests a systemic relationship between technological asymmetry 
and coalition structure.  Figure 2 illustrates this process relationship.  Technological 
asymmetries emerge as coalitions assemble.  Preferences for lower risk and greater 
effectiveness lead a coalition to rely on the most capable technologies.  As the coalition 
develops dependence on these technologies, the dominant participant assumes greater 
combat burdens and leadership responsibilities, which inadvertently or intentionally 
imposes  its operational culture on the coalition. 
Time intervenes in this process inversely.  When minimum time is available for a 
coalition to organize and prepare for combat, the process represented in Figure 2 is most 
severe.  Without time to address interoperability discrepancies, exclusion functions 
inherent in sensitive, proprietary technologies decrease multilateral participation as the 




Figure 2.   Technology Asymmetry and Coalition Structures Process Trace 
 
When sufficient time exists for a coalition to troubleshoot interoperability issues, 
work-arounds implemented to mitigate compatibility problems allow wider participation 
by its members.  Work-arounds, however, tend to rely on technologies provided by the 
advantaged partner.  Interoperability patches achieved through work-arounds still add 
operational and command and control burdens to the advantaged partner, which create 
additional ways of  increasing the influence of its operational style. 
In the absence of technology parity, a coalition tends to resemble the operational 
culture of the technologically advantaged partner.  The more stark the asymmetries and 
the less time available to address them, the more operations reflect the advantaged 
partner’s war fighting paradigm.  Thus, the greater the technological lead of one partner, 
the more coalition operations appear unilateral in form and execution, regardless of 
rhetoric about the desirability of multilateral participation in all facets of coalition 
operations.  Figure 2 represents this general relationship as applied to the United States: 
current U.S. initiatives contributing to its technology-driven RMA contributes to it 
assuming nearly unilateral responsibility for the combat operations undertaken by the 
coalitions it joins. 
As a coalition assembles, the time spent preparing for combat operations also 
provides an opportunity for the coalition to tailor operations to fit political objectives.  As 
argued in Chapter IV, more time allows wider coalition participation in planning as a 
coalition implements work-arounds to technological asymmetries.  Wider participation 
provides more channels of communication for allies to engage in discourse between the 
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political level and operational level of a coalition.  OAF demonstrated that the converse 
to this relationship also is true: without time to prepare, military readiness outpaces 
political deliberations and, therefore, the military is unable to accommodate political 
concerns into operational planning. 
   
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR COALITION OPERATIONS 
 
1. Political-Operational Mismatch 
The process illustrated in Figure 2 suggests two scenarios.  OAF demonstrated the 
first scenario: operational dominance by one partner leads to disconnects between 
political objectives and operational culture.  Military force cannot be a cure all for every 
international problem, especially the high-speed, high-tech force that the United States 
currently possesses.  As the United States continues to struggle with an appropriate 
military posture for the future, the prospect of scenarios requiring political solutions or 
force configurations incompatible with U.S. instruments of power grows.203   
The operational culture imported by the United States in OAF did not align with 
the conservative, incremental approach desired by the nations participating.  The 
disconnect between political leadership and operational culture suggests that relationships 
flowing from technological asymmetry remain at the operational level of war and do not 
bleed into a coalition’s political process.   
Multilateral coalitions may thus actually impede rather than improve U.S. 
operations.  Military forces train, equip, and organize based on the policies and strategies 
of its national leadership.  In the United States, the President transmits his grand strategy 
through the National Security Strategy document, which the DoD translates into training, 
funding, and organizing initiatives to meet his strategy.  A coalition dominated by a 
military tailored to one nation’s grand strategy risks friction when many nations with 
differing grand strategies provide political guidance for the conduct of military 
operations. 
                                                 
203 Thomas Johnson and James Russell argue that the United States continues to struggle as its 
traditional instruments of national power appear to be ill-suited for the current world situation.  See Thomas 
H. Johnson and James E. Russell, 2005, “A Hard Day’s Night? The United States and the Global War on 
Terrorism,” Comparative Strategy, 24, 128.  
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Desert Storm demonstrated that friction between national leaders and military 
officers can be mitigated by using time available to integrate coalition forces.  The 
integration process opens channels of communication both among member nations and 
between political and military leaders.  Time for planning generates wider participation, 
allowing operational culture to more closely align with political intent. 
 
2. Disruptive Technologies: Asymmetrical Threat 
The second scenario highlights how coalitions can end up on the losing end of a 
disruptive technology scenario.204  U.S. technologies continue to grow rapidly through a 
“sustaining innovation” process where current technologies evolve through incremental 
improvements and new technologies enter service only by ensuring complete 
compatibility with the current systems.205  Allies unable or unwilling to keep pace with 
U.S. progress will be unable to interface with U.S. capabilities.   
The process described in Chapter III suggests that growing technological 
dominance by one partner attenuates other partner’s influence on operational structures.  
As a result, potentially innovative approaches or unique technologies risk exclusion if 
they cannot integrate with the dominant partner’s technologies.  Relying on a single 
operational paradigm risks blindness to potential asymmetric threats or, even worse, risks 




                                                 
204 Joseph Bower describes the disruptive technologies as innovations unsuccessful in traditional 
markets but cause new markets to form as new applications develop around the innovation. He uses the 
example of the personal computers that mainframe giant, IBM, did not consider useful or competitive but 
Apple and Radio Shack used to create a new home-computer market. See Joseph L. Bower and Clayton M. 
Christensen, 1995, “Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave,” Harvard Business Review, 73 (1) 
(January-February):43-53.  
205 Terry Pierce states that sustaining innovations “result in improved performance along a trajectory 
that traditionally has been valued.” See Terry C. Pierce, 2004, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: 
Disguising Innovation, New York: Frank Cass.  
206 Johnson and Russell argue that an international system increasingly driven by “sub-system 
dynamics” increases the threat from non-state actors presenting an asymmetric threat to U.S. instruments of 
power oriented toward traditional, state-owned threats. Johnson and Russell, 128. 
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3. Opposing Strategies  
From the technological perspective, the United States currently pursues two 
potentially contradictory strategies for future military operations.  On one hand, growing 
uncertainty about the future of the international system raises doubt about the 
configuration of U.S. instruments of power.207  Multilateralism and coalition operations 
offer American administrations political flexibility and international credibility that are 
the fundamental building blocs of any successful military endeavor as an alternative to 
unilateral military operations.   
On the other hand, the DoD continues to chase its elusive “Transformation,” but 
seems focused on the force multiplying promise in high-intensity combat created by the 
continuous introduction of leading-edge technology to military systems.  The goal is to 
capture the benefits promised by the information revolution: a highly integrated, high-
speed, long range, agile military force.   
With defense budgets approaching that of the rest of the world combined, 
however,  the United States simply outpaces its allies in the procurement and integration 
of high-technology into its military systems and operations.  Not only does this guarantee 
that future coalitions will experience technological asymmetry, but the problems 
associated with asymmetry will intensify.  The U.S. technology-driven transformation 
continues to advance in the direction of more dense and complex systems that make 
allied participation in U.S. coalitions increasingly more difficult. 
The mismatch between political leadership and operational culture described in 
Chapter IV typifies the conflict between these two strategies.  In OAF, political 
constraints forcing incremental applications of power and slower, more deliberate 
targeting did not exploit the high-speed tactics of parallel attack.  Operational culture 
seeking strategic paralysis was unable to adjust for a different political environment.  The 
issues generated by pursuing the technology school and multilateral school strategies will 
only intensify as the United States continues to pursue technology-oriented military 
solutions on one hand and greater international cooperation on the other. 
                                                 
207 Johnson and Russell argue that an international system increasingly driven by “sub-system 
dynamics” increases the threat from non-state actors presenting an asymmetric threat to U.S. instruments of 




1. Embrace Unilateralism 
If the price of pursuing force-multiplying, risk-reducing technologies is greater 
unilateralism, then maybe U.S. diplomacy should begin to mirror this reality.   The costs 
of implementing combined training programs, technology transfers, and exchange 
programs are great and the evidence suggests that long-term programs designed to 
develop fixes to interoperability programs are only marginally successful.  Even a 
coalition consisting of allied forces with a long history of close cooperation will suffer 
interoperability deficiencies related to technological asymmetry.   
Pursuing unilateral military solutions provides a single, coherent command 
structure with an operational culture tailored specifically to its political leadership.  A 
direct, unambiguous chain of command will provide for greater accountability and 
increased strategic flexibility.  As a corollary, if U.S. leadership still desires multilateral 
participation, then it should enter a coalition making no bones about its role as leader of 
the coalition. 
 This type of strategy, however, could entail significant political costs.  Unilateral 
military operations alienate allies and diminish domestic and international public opinion.  
Without the assistance of allies, the United States would also lose invaluable support in 
the form of diplomatic reinforcement, logistics, and basing infrastructure.  What the 
United States may gain in streamlined, operational efficiency may also be lost in political 
isolation.   
 
2. Change Investment Priorities 
If the future of U.S. foreign policy involves increasing multilateral participation, 
then investment priorities should focus on initiatives that enhance cooperation with allies.  
With acquisition and R&D investment more than twice that of our allies, the DoD can 
accept more risk in high-technology R&D to resource alternative programs.  If the 
administration wishes to pursue multilateral solutions, it should accept greater risk in 
military technologies by slowing development and fielding timelines while using the 
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resulting dividends to invest in greater diplomatic efforts such as personnel exchanges, 
language and regional studies, and aid-related initiatives. 
NATO initiatives aimed at transferring technology and increasing interoperability 
indicate that complete technological interoperability may be unachievable.  If this is the 
case, then the U.S. DoD must invest more resources in non-technology means to 
establishing and maintaining interoperability with its allies. 
Diverting resources away from technology and defense acquisition include many 
potentially negative ramifications.  Historically, force-multiplying technologies have 
provided the United States with superior military advantage without having to maintain 
an enormous force structure.  Defense acquisitions tie directly into the well-connected 
defense industry, which means significant congressional resistance to any decrease in 
acquisition funding.  The task of shifting resources away from defense acquisition and 
toward less tangible initiatives such as personnel exchanges, language proficiency, and 
aid programs may involve nearly impossible domestic obstacles to overcome.  
 
3.  Change U.S. Operational Culture. 
Currently U.S. operational culture pays little respect to true coalition operations.  
Currently, CENTCOM planners plan contingencies with areas for potential allies to “plug 
into” U.S. operations.  Pacific Command spends tremendous resources on training and 
technology transfer programs to ensure regional allies are familiar with the American 
way of war fighting.  Both strategies assume future coalitions to adopt U.S. operational 
characteristics; neither strategy earnestly incorporates potential allied contributors as peer 
members of an operation.208 
If the United States wishes to pursue both the technology school and 
multilateralism school simultaneously, it must merge these schools into a coherent 
strategy capitalizing on the potential synergies of a holistic strategy.  U.S. planners must 
war game operational organizations and contingency plans for numerous political 
                                                 
208 For a description of the strategies each combatant command uses in considering allies in 
contingency planning, see Robyn Read, 2003, Coalition Warfare: Coordination and Planning Options.  
Maxwell AFB, AL: Airpower Research Institute, Research Paper 2003-02. 
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scenarios and various national participants.  U.S. military leaders must be willing to 
sacrifice efficiency in return for the political benefits of multilateralism. 
A holistic approach to coalition operations, however, involves much more than 
bureaucratic adjustments and policy changes.  Fundamental operational philosophies 
must change as well.  For example, jealous protection of information technologies and 
intelligence means must end in favor of open architectures and information access; strict 
ROE favoring low risk operations may require loosening to allow wider international 
participation, and military leaders may have to cede some control over operations to 
allied participants.  U.S. military professionals have to be capable of entering a coalition 
without considering it “my fight” in which other contributors may be permitted to 
participate if they can keep up. 
From a military perspective, the costs involved in the holistic approach are large.  
It involves sacrificing the very things the American public has expected from its military: 
high-speed, highly efficient operations; near-bloodless combat; and short campaigns.  
Future coalition operations may have to become more “messy” in order to ensure greater 
participation and wider distribution of the combat burden. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Technology asymmetry contributes directly to operational structures within a 
coalition that effect its multilateral character.  Greater asymmetry and limited time leads 
to operational dominance by the technologically advantaged partner.  In the United 
States, the drive toward high technology, force-multiplying military solutions runs 
counter to the political desire to pursue greater multilateral cooperation.  While both the 
technology school and multilateralism school offer benefits for U.S. international power, 
proponents of both schools fail to consider the other in their recommendations for the 
future.  Inevitably, these two schools converge when the international community dictates 
a coalition in response to crisis.          
U.S. foreign policy requires a more holistic approach to future coalition 
operations.  The implications of the DoD’s technology-driven transformation reverberate 
well beyond the U.S. military.  If the Unites States’ current defense transformation 
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continues on its current vector, it risks unilateralism by default as U.S. allies become 
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